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Saturday, June 28, 2025

An Analysis of Coal Mining, Policy, and Economic Reality in Pocahontas County

 

The Illusion of Return: An Analysis of Coal Mining, Policy, and Economic Reality in Pocahontas County, WV (2017-2021)



Executive Summary


This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the state of the coal mining industry in Pocahontas County, West Virginia, during the presidential administration of Donald J. Trump (2017-2021). The central inquiry is to determine whether a "return" of coal mining occurred in the county, as might be suggested by the administration's national pro-coal rhetoric and policy agenda. The investigation reveals that the narrative of a coal revival in Pocahontas County is an illusion, unsupported by empirical evidence.


The primary finding of this report is that coal mining activity in Pocahontas County was negligible to non-existent throughout the 2017-2021 period. Official data from the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training (WVOMHST) shows zero coal production in 2017 and minimal, unsustained activity in other years, with one significant data anomaly in 2020 that appears to be a reporting error. This factual absence of a coal renaissance stands in stark contrast to the political narrative of the time.


The report deconstructs the origins of this misleading narrative, identifying three key sources of confusion:


  1. Geographic Misattribution: A failure to distinguish between Pocahontas County, the historic Pocahontas Coalfield (centered primarily in Mercer and McDowell counties), and the modern Pocahontas Coal Company, LLC (a subsidiary of Metinvest B.V. operating chiefly in Raleigh County).


  1. Misinterpretation of Statewide Trends: A temporary, statewide uptick in West Virginia coal production in 2017 was driven largely by international demand for metallurgical coal from other regions of the state, not by a broad-based revival of the thermal coal industry that had historically dominated.


  1. Data Integrity Issues: A significant and unexplained anomaly in the 2020 state-level production data for Pocahontas County created a statistical mirage of a massive, one-year boom that is contradicted by data from the years immediately preceding and following it.


While the Trump administration enacted a suite of significant pro-coal policies—including the repeal of the Stream Protection Rule and the replacement of the Clean Power Plan with the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule—these actions failed to catalyze a return of mining in Pocahontas County. The analysis concludes that federal policies were unable to overcome fundamental, place-based realities: the county's depleted coal geology, its established and conflicting tourism-based economy, and market forces that favored metallurgical coal from other regions. This case study underscores the critical importance of precise, data-driven analysis and place-based economic strategies over monolithic industrial narratives.


Section 1: The Appalachian Context: West Virginia's Coal Industry and Pocahontas County's Economy Pre-2017


To accurately assess any changes during the 2017-2021 period, it is essential to first establish a clear baseline of the economic conditions preceding the Trump administration. This requires a dual analysis: one of the West Virginia coal industry at large, which was in a state of profound crisis, and one of Pocahontas County's specific economic structure, which had long since diverged from the state's traditional coal-dependent model.


1.1 The Statewide Decline of King Coal


By the time the Trump administration took office in 2017, the West Virginia coal industry was the shadow of its former self. The decline was not a recent phenomenon but a long-term structural trend accelerated by market and policy pressures in the preceding decade. Statewide production had fallen precipitously from a peak of over 170 million short tons in 1996 to just 80.1 million short tons by 2016.1 This collapse had profound consequences for employment and state revenue. During the Obama administration (2009-2016) alone, West Virginia's coal production declined by 29%, and direct mining employment plummeted from approximately 23,000 to just 14,000 workers.3


This decline was driven by a confluence of powerful market forces. The primary driver was economic: the domestic energy landscape was fundamentally altered by the shale gas boom, which made natural gas an abundant and significantly cheaper fuel for electricity generation.1 As a result, electric utilities curtailed operations at coal-fired power plants, eroding coal's primary domestic market. This market pressure was compounded by a stricter environmental regulatory climate. Regulations such as the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), aimed at reducing emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2​), nitrogen oxides (NOx​), and mercury, increased the compliance costs for older coal plants, further incentivizing a switch to natural gas or renewables.1


The employment data reflects this stark reality. Nationally, total employment in the coal industry peaked in 2012 at over 143,000 workers before entering a period of steep decline, falling to just over 102,000 by 2015.5 In West Virginia, the impact was particularly acute in the southern coalfields, which historically produced the majority of the state's coal. A contiguous three-county bloc—Boone, Logan, and Mingo—saw its cumulative coal production drop by a staggering 65% between its 2008 peak and 2015.6 


This pre-existing economic devastation created the political and social landscape upon which the Trump campaign's promises to "bring back coal" and end the "war on coal" found fertile ground.7 The narrative of an industry under siege, particularly by federal environmental regulations, became a powerful political tool, even though the decline was equally, if not more so, driven by fundamental market competition.


1.2 The Unique Economic Profile of Pocahontas County


In stark contrast to the heavily industrialized and coal-dependent counties of Southern West Virginia, Pocahontas County had cultivated a distinct economic identity long before 2017. While geographically situated within the broader Appalachian coal region and sometimes classified as part of the "Southern West Virginia" coal-producing district, its on-the-ground economy was not primarily driven by mining.1


Data from the period reveals an economy based on services, healthcare, and, most importantly, tourism. The county's largest employment sectors are Health Care & Social Assistance, Retail Trade, and Construction.8 This economic structure is a direct result of the county's rich natural assets. Marketed as "Nature's Mountain Playground," Pocahontas County is home to the Monongahela National Forest, Snowshoe Mountain Resort (a major four-season destination), Cass Scenic Railroad State Park, and the Green Bank Observatory.9 These assets form the backbone of a robust tourism and recreation industry, which generated over $144 million in travel spending in 2021 alone.10


This is not to say that extractive industries are entirely absent. The county has an active limestone quarrying industry, with operations like the Boxley quarry in Mill Point supplying agricultural lime and crushed stone to the region.12 However, coal mining's role has been minimal. While the "Mining, Quarrying, & Oil & Gas Extraction" sector offers some of the highest-paying jobs in the county, it is not a significant source of overall employment.8 This distinction between high wages for a few and the primary drivers of broad-based employment is a critical nuance in understanding the county's economy. The economic well-being of Pocahontas County was, and is, far more tied to visitor spending and the preservation of its natural scenery than to the price of metallurgical or thermal coal.


The pre-2017 economic divergence between Pocahontas County and its coal-producing neighbors set the stage for how federal policy would be received. While a national pro-coal agenda might resonate culturally and politically across West Virginia, its direct economic impact was destined to be uneven. For counties like Boone or Logan, where the economy was existentially tied to coal, policies easing regulations on mining could have a direct, tangible effect.6 For Pocahontas County, whose economic engine was tourism, the same policies would have a negligible impact, as there was no significant coal industry to "revive." This fundamental mismatch between a blanket federal policy and the specific, place-based reality of the county's economy is central to understanding the events of 2017-2021.



Table 1: Comparative Economic Snapshot, Pre-Administration (2016) | Metric | Pocahontas County | Raleigh County (Contrast) | State of West Virginia | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Total Coal Production (short tons) | 0 | 5,306,478 | 80,100,000 | | Coal Mining Employment | 0 | 1,213 | 14,000 | | Top 3 Employment Sectors | Health Care/Social Asst., Retail, Construction | Health Care/Social Asst., Retail, Accommodation/Food Svc. | Health Care/Social Asst., Retail, Accommodation/Food Svc. | | Median Household Income | $41,200 (2019-2023) | $46,432 (2019-2023) | $55,217 (2019-2023) | | Poverty Rate | 19.2% (2019-2023) | 18.2% (2019-2023) | 16.8% (2019-2023) | Sources:.

2 Note: Production and employment data for counties and state are from WVOMHST reports for calendar year 2016. Income and poverty data are from the most recent available 5-year ACS estimates to provide a stable baseline.



Section 2: A Tale of Two Pocahontases: Deconstructing Coal Activity (2017-2021)


An empirical examination of coal production and employment data from 2017 to 2021 definitively shows that a "return" of coal mining did not occur in Pocahontas County. The persistence of this narrative can be traced to a conflation of geographic and corporate names, coupled with a misunderstanding of regional market dynamics. By disaggregating the data, this section clarifies the reality on the ground in Pocahontas County versus the activity taking place under the "Pocahontas" name elsewhere.


2.1 The Data Void and Anomaly in Pocahontas County


Official annual reports from the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training (WVOMHST) provide the most direct evidence regarding county-level coal activity. The data for Pocahontas County during the Trump administration is striking in its near-total absence of production:


  • 2017: The WVOMHST annual report for calendar year 2017 lists Pocahontas County with zero tons of coal produced and zero employees in the coal sector.16

  • FY2018: The fiscal year report shows no production or employment.17

  • FY2019: The fiscal year report indicates minimal activity, with 82,971 tons produced and an employment of 31 people.18

  • FY2021: The fiscal year report shows a return to minimal levels, with 293,926 tons produced but only a single employee listed. This tonnage is attributed to limestone quarrying in another table within the same report, suggesting it may not be coal at all.19


The most significant point of confusion arises from the 2020 WVOMHST annual report. This single document reports that Pocahontas County produced 4,260,626 tons of coal and employed 989 people.20 This figure represents a massive, inexplicable outlier. It is contradicted by the data from every other year in the period and is inconsistent with all other available economic data for the county. Given that the WVOMHST website includes a disclaimer that "the state is not liable for any damages resulting from any information that unintentionally may be inaccurate or untimely," this 2020 figure is best understood as a significant data reporting or entry error.14 Without this anomalous data point, the record is clear: there was no sustained, large-scale coal mining operation in Pocahontas County during the period.


This lack of coal activity is further underscored by evidence of what extractive industries are present. The county is home to active limestone quarries, such as the Boxley Materials quarry at Mill Point, which expanded its agricultural lime production during this period.13 Furthermore, a major federal proposal by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to build a new underground experimental mine in the county was designed to be built in limestone formations, not coal seams.9


2.2 The "Pocahontas" Misnomer: Coalfield vs. Company


The primary source of the narrative of a "return to Pocahontas" stems from the conflation of three distinct entities:

  1. Pocahontas County: The geographic and political entity, which, as established, has minimal to no coal production.

  2. The Pocahontas Coalfield: A large, historically significant geological formation renowned for its high-quality, low-volatile No. 3 coal seam. This coalfield is centered primarily in Mercer and McDowell counties in West Virginia and neighboring Tazewell County, Virginia—not in Pocahontas County.22 News or discussion about mining the "Pocahontas seam" refers to this region, not the county.

  3. Pocahontas Coal Company, LLC: A modern mining operator and a subsidiary of the international steel and mining group Metinvest B.V..25 Crucially, this company's operations in West Virginia are located almost entirely outside of Pocahontas County. Its active mines during this period, including the Wyco Surface Mine, the Affinity Mine, and the Beckley Pocahontas Mine, are located in
    Raleigh County.19 The Pocahontas HWM 52 surface mine is also located in Raleigh County.25


Therefore, any report of production by the "Pocahontas Coal Company" or from the "Pocahontas Coalfield" is factually a report of activity in other counties, primarily Raleigh, Mercer, and McDowell. This geographic and corporate distinction is the key to deconstructing the misleading narrative.


2.3 A Regional, Metallurgical-Focused Rebound


While Pocahontas County remained dormant, the broader West Virginia coal industry did experience a brief, limited resurgence at the beginning of the Trump administration. Statewide production, which had bottomed out at around 80 million short tons in 2016, rebounded to approximately 93 million short tons in 2017.30


However, this was not a revival of the traditional thermal coal industry. The growth was almost entirely driven by a surge in international demand for metallurgical coal (also known as coking coal), which is a critical ingredient for steel manufacturing.


 This export-driven boom led to the opening of several new metallurgical mines in the state's southern coalfields. For example, in June 2017, Alpha Natural Resources (now Alpha Metallurgical Resources) opened the Panther Eagle Mine in Raleigh County, citing 8.8 million tons of metallurgical reserves.32 Similarly, CONSOL Energy announced plans in 2020 to open the Itmann Mine in Wyoming County to extract coal from the famed Pocahontas No. 3 seam for the metallurgical market.33


This demonstrates that where a "return" of coal did occur in West Virginia, it was highly specific in both type (metallurgical) and location (southern counties with rich met coal reserves). It was not a widespread renaissance and it did not extend to Pocahontas County, which lacks the specific geological assets that were in high demand. The national political discussion often failed to capture this crucial market distinction, treating all "coal" as a monolith.



Table 2: Comparative Coal Production & Employment, 2017-2021 | Year | Pocahontas County Production (tons) | Pocahontas County Employment | Raleigh County Production (tons) | Raleigh County Employment | WV Statewide Production (tons) | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | 2017 | 0 | 0 | 7,003,264 | 1,509 | 93,000,000 (approx.) | | 2018 | 0 | 0 | Data not available in provided reports | Data not available in provided reports | 92,000,000 (approx.) | | 2019 (FY) | 82,971 | 31 | 7,236,718 | 1,542 | 93,500,000 (approx.) | | 2020 (CY) | 4,260,626* | 989* | 6,671,608 | 1,299 | 73,356,066 | | 2021 (FY) | 293,926 | 1 | 6,875,818 | 1,269 | 84,600,00 (2023 data) | Sources:.16




*Note: The 2020 figures for Pocahontas County are considered significant outliers and likely represent a data reporting error, as they are inconsistent with all other available data for the 2017-2021 period.




Section 3: The Policy Levers: The Trump Administration's Pro-Coal Agenda (2017-2021)


The Trump administration made the revival of the American coal industry a central plank of its economic and energy platform. This commitment was translated into a series of significant policy actions aimed at dismantling perceived regulatory burdens and actively promoting coal production and use. Understanding these policy levers is crucial to assessing their intended effects and ultimate impact, or lack thereof, in places like Pocahontas County.


3.1 Dismantling Environmental Regulations


A primary thrust of the administration's strategy was the aggressive rollback of environmental regulations enacted by the previous administration, which were framed by proponents as a "war on coal."


The Stream Protection Rule (SPR) Repeal:


Finalized in the last days of the Obama administration, the Stream Protection Rule was designed to update 30-year-old regulations to better protect waterways from the impacts of surface coal mining.36 The rule would have established stricter requirements for baseline data collection, monitoring, and restoration, with the Department of the Interior estimating it would safeguard 6,000 miles of streams and 52,000 acres of forests over two decades.37 Opponents in the industry and Congress, however, characterized it as a burdensome overreach that would "regulate the coal mining industry right out of business".38


In February 2017, just weeks into the new administration, Congress used the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to pass a resolution of disapproval, which President Trump promptly signed into law, nullifying the rule.38 Proponents of the repeal claimed it would save thousands of mining jobs.38 Opponents, including environmental groups, argued that the rule's costs were minimal—estimated at an average of just $0.01 per ton of coal—and that its repeal threatened drinking water sources and endangered species in Appalachian communities.37 The use of the CRA is particularly significant, as it not only repeals the regulation but also prohibits the agency from issuing any "substantially similar" rule in the future without new authorization from Congress, creating a long-term regulatory void.37


The Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule:


The administration's signature climate policy for the power sector was the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, finalized by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2019.42 It served as the official replacement for the Obama-era Clean Power Plan (CPP), a more ambitious regulation that had been stayed by the Supreme Court and never went into effect.44

The two rules represented fundamentally different approaches. The CPP set state-level carbon dioxide (CO2​) emissions reduction targets and allowed states flexibility in meeting them, including through "outside the fenceline" measures like shifting generation from coal to natural gas or renewables.45


 In contrast, the ACE rule was narrowly focused "inside the fenceline." It defined the "best system of emission reduction" (BSER) for existing coal-fired power plants as a set of six on-site "heat rate improvement" (HRI) measures—essentially, efficiency upgrades.43 States were then directed to evaluate these technologies to establish performance standards for each individual coal plant.43


The projected impact of the ACE rule was modest. The EPA's own analysis acknowledged that the rule could lead to a "rebound effect," where more efficient coal plants are run more frequently, potentially increasing overall emissions in some states.47 One study projected that under ACE, CO2​ emissions would increase in 18 states compared to a no-policy scenario.47 The rule's lifespan was short; it was vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2021, which found that the EPA's narrow interpretation of its authority was flawed.42


3.2 Promoting "Energy Dominance" through Executive Action


Beyond deregulation, the administration used its executive authority to actively promote the coal industry under the banner of "American Energy Dominance." A series of executive orders, including one titled "Reinvigorating America's Beautiful Clean Coal Industry," set a clear policy direction for federal agencies.48


Key actions included:


  • Ending the Coal Leasing Moratorium: In 2017, the administration formally ended a moratorium on new federal coal leasing that had been put in place by the Obama administration. This action was intended to reopen vast tracts of federal land, particularly in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana, to future coal extraction.50

  • Expediting Permitting: Agencies were directed to dramatically shorten timelines for environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Reviews that previously took years were to be condensed to months or even weeks, with the goal of removing barriers to new energy projects.48

  • Providing Royalty Rate Relief: The Department of the Interior was instructed to streamline the process for coal companies to request temporary reductions in the royalty rates they pay for extracting coal from public lands. This was designed to lower operating costs and help keep marginal mines in business.50

  • Investing in "Coal Country": The administration directed funding through programs like the Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER) Program. In fiscal year 2025 (as announced in a forward-looking press release), this program allocated $28.67 million to West Virginia to support economic development projects on former mine lands.51


These policies, taken together, constituted a comprehensive effort to lower the costs and regulatory hurdles for coal producers. However, a critical examination reveals a disconnect between the primary targets of these policies and the specific market segment that experienced a temporary revival in West Virginia. 


The ACE Rule and exemptions to other air toxics standards were aimed at preserving the domestic fleet of thermal coal power plants. The end of the leasing moratorium primarily benefited surface mining in the American West. Yet the actual growth driver in West Virginia was metallurgical coal for export, a market more sensitive to global steel demand than to the operating costs of a domestic power plant or the availability of federal land in Wyoming. While the administration's overall pro-coal posture likely boosted industry confidence, its flagship policies were not precisely tailored to the forces driving the state's limited rebound.


Table 3: Key Trump Administration Coal-Related Policies and Their Mechanisms (2017-2021) | Policy/Action | Date Enacted/Repealed | Stated Objective | Primary Mechanism | Target Sector | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Repeal of Stream Protection Rule | Feb. 2017 | Reduce regulatory burden, save mining jobs | Congressional Review Act resolution to nullify the rule | Surface Coal Mining | | Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule | June 2019 (Finalized) | Replace Clean Power Plan, provide achievable standards | Redefine BSER to on-site heat rate improvements only | Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants (Thermal Coal) | | End of Federal Coal Leasing Moratorium | Mar. 2017 | Unleash American energy, increase access to reserves | Secretarial Order revoking the 2016 moratorium | Future Coal Mining on Federal Lands (Primarily Western U.S.) | | AMLER Program Funding | Ongoing | Spur economic growth in former mining communities | Grants for reclamation and redevelopment projects | Economically Distressed "Coal Country" | | Expedited NEPA Reviews | Ongoing | Reduce permitting timelines for energy projects | Executive Orders and agency directives | All Energy Infrastructure, including Coal | Sources:.38



Section 4: Synthesis and Impact Analysis: The Disconnect Between Policy and Place


The comprehensive pro-coal agenda of the Trump administration represented a significant shift in federal policy. However, its tangible impact on the ground was neither uniform nor universal. The case of Pocahontas County serves as a powerful illustration of the limits of top-down policy in the face of deeply entrenched local realities. The failure of a coal "return" in the county was not due to a lack of political will in Washington; rather, it was a function of fundamental geological, economic, and market constraints that no federal policy could easily overcome.



4.1 Geological and Market Constraints


The most fundamental barrier to a coal revival in Pocahontas County is geology. A county cannot mine what it does not have in economically recoverable quantities. While the broader Pocahontas Coalfield is famous for its rich seams, particularly the metallurgical-grade Pocahontas No. 3, the heart of this formation lies in other counties like McDowell, Mercer, and Wyoming.22 


The brief statewide boom from 2017-2018 was overwhelmingly driven by demand for this high-quality metallurgical coal for export to feed a global steel market.30 Companies opened new mines where these specific reserves were located, such as in Raleigh and Wyoming counties.32 Pocahontas County, lacking such abundant and accessible reserves, was simply not a candidate for this type of investment. No amount of deregulation or permitting reform can create a valuable coal seam where one is depleted or geologically absent.


Furthermore, the administration's most significant regulatory actions were mismatched with the actual market opportunity. The ACE Rule, for instance, was designed to provide relief to domestic thermal coal plants that generate electricity.43 While this may have slowed the retirement of some plants nationally, it did little to stimulate new demand in a market shrinking due to competition from cheap natural gas.49 The policy was aimed at a declining domestic market, while the temporary growth in West Virginia was occurring in the export-oriented metallurgical market. This demonstrates a crucial disconnect between the policy's mechanism and the market's reality.


4.2 The Established Tourism Economy as a Barrier


Beyond geology, the economic principle of path dependency played a decisive role. Over decades, Pocahontas County has successfully built a diverse and resilient economy centered on tourism, outdoor recreation, and conservation.10 This established economic path creates a high barrier to the re-introduction of a conflicting industry like large-scale coal mining.


There is an inherent and irreconcilable tension between an economy branded as "Nature's Mountain Playground" and the environmental impacts of industrial mining. The very assets that draw tourists to the county—pristine forests, clean streams, and scenic beauty—are those most threatened by surface mining operations, which can lead to deforestation, water contamination from heavy metals, and the destruction of landscapes.37 An attempt to restart a major mining operation would risk damaging the county's primary economic engine for the sake of reviving a secondary, historically minor one.



Local sentiment reflects this understanding. The significant community opposition to the proposed NIOSH experimental mine at Mace is telling. Even though the project was for research and was to be built in limestone, residents, local businesses, and the Pocahontas County Commission raised serious concerns about the potential impacts on groundwater in the sensitive karst geology, the headwaters of two rivers, and the disruption of tourism traffic near Snowshoe Resort.9 This reaction indicates a strong local commitment to protecting the environmental assets that underpin the tourism economy, making the county an inhospitable environment for new, large-scale industrial projects.


4.3 The Limits of Political Rhetoric


The political environment during the Trump administration was unquestionably favorable to the coal industry. The "Trump digs coal" narrative was powerful in West Virginia, a state that shifted dramatically to the Republican party, partly in response to what was perceived as the Democratic party's "war on coal".7 State leaders, including Governor Jim Justice, aligned closely with the administration's energy agenda, promising that West Virginia would "win like never before" through its partnership with the president.7


However, the story of Pocahontas County demonstrates the clear limits of this political capital. Rhetoric and policy alignment in Charleston and Washington D.C. could not alter the geological facts or economic incentives on the ground. The national political discourse, which often treats "Appalachia" or "coal country" as a monolith, failed to capture the nuanced, localized transitions already underway.


 While the state and the nation debated the fate of coal, Pocahontas County was quietly and successfully building a post-coal economy. The administration's policies may have provided a confidence boost to the industry in regions where it was still viable, but they could not engineer a renaissance where the fundamental conditions—geology, markets, and a conflicting local economic identity—were not supportive. The experience of Pocahontas County is a case study in how place-based realities can, and do, override top-down political and industrial narratives.


Section 5: Conclusion and Strategic Recommendations


The investigation into the "return of coal mining to Pocahontas County, West Virginia, under the Trump administration" yields a clear and decisive conclusion. The narrative of a revival is a fiction, constructed from a combination of geographic misattribution, the misinterpretation of statewide trends, and the powerful influence of a national political agenda. The reality is that federal pro-coal policies, while significant in their scope, were ultimately impotent in the face of local geological and economic fundamentals. This case study offers critical lessons for policymakers, journalists, researchers, and data agencies seeking to understand and engage with the complex energy transition in Appalachia.


5.1 Conclusion: The Anatomy of a Misleading Narrative


The analysis confirms that no tangible, sustained return of the coal industry occurred in Pocahontas County between 2017 and 2021. The widespread belief in such a return can be attributed to the conflation of Pocahontas County with the historic Pocahontas Coalfield and the modern Pocahontas Coal Company, LLC—entities located and operating in other West Virginia counties, primarily Raleigh, Mercer, and McDowell.



The brief statewide uptick in coal production in 2017 was not a broad-based revival but a niche, market-driven event, spurred by international demand for metallurgical coal for steelmaking. This specific demand did not align with the geology of Pocahontas County, nor did it align with the primary focus of the Trump administration's key regulatory rollbacks, such as the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which targeted domestic thermal coal plants. Ultimately, the administration's pro-coal agenda failed to catalyze investment in Pocahontas County because it could not change the fact that the valuable coal was elsewhere and that the county's established, thriving tourism economy created a direct conflict with the environmental impacts of mining.


5.2 Recommendations for Policymakers


  • Embrace Place-Based Economic Strategy: Federal and state economic development initiatives for Appalachia must abandon one-size-fits-all approaches. Policy must be tailored to the specific assets, challenges, and opportunities of individual counties or micro-regions. For Pocahontas County, this means investing in and supporting its established tourism, outdoor recreation, and conservation-based economy, rather than attempting to resurrect a dormant industry.52

  • Invest in Genuine Economic Diversification: Acknowledge that for many Appalachian counties, the coal economy is not returning. Lasting economic health will come from fostering new sectors. This requires a strategic shift from subsidizing legacy industries to investing in the infrastructure, education, and entrepreneurship needed for a diversified future, a conclusion supported by research from West Virginia University's Bureau of Business and Economic Research.56

  • Fund Data-Driven Decision Making: Equip local and regional planning bodies, like the Region 4 Planning and Development Council, with the resources to conduct accurate, granular economic analysis.58 Policy and public investment should be guided by empirical evidence of a region's strengths and weaknesses, not by outdated assumptions or national political narratives.


5.3 Recommendations for Researchers and Journalists


  • Practice Geographic and Corporate Precision: The primary lesson from this analysis is the danger of imprecision. In reporting on industrial trends, it is imperative to meticulously differentiate between administrative boundaries (counties), geological formations (coalfields), and corporate entities. Using these names interchangeably, as was the source of the "Pocahontas" confusion, is a form of factual error that can create and perpetuate false narratives.

  • Scrutinize Official Data: Government data, while essential, should not be accepted without scrutiny. The anomalous 2020 production figures for Pocahontas County in the WVOMHST report highlight the potential for significant errors.20 Journalists and researchers must cross-reference data, question outliers, and be transparent with their audience about data limitations and inconsistencies.

  • Challenge Dominant Narratives with Local Evidence: The most powerful function of local and regional reporting is to test broad national narratives against on-the-ground reality. The story of Pocahontas County provides a template for this work. By using county-level data and local reporting, journalists can provide a crucial check on political rhetoric and offer a more nuanced, accurate picture of complex issues like the energy transition.


5.4 Recommendations for Data Agencies (e.g., WVOMHST, EIA)


  • Enhance Data Verification and Transparency: Implement more rigorous internal and external data verification processes to prevent and rapidly correct significant errors, such as the one observed in the 2020 report. When major discrepancies are identified, agencies should issue public corrections and explanations to maintain trust and prevent the spread of misinformation.14

  • Improve Data Presentation and Accessibility: To prevent geographic confusion, public reports and databases should, whenever possible, clearly list the county of operation alongside company names. Continuing to develop and improve publicly accessible, queryable databases is a positive and necessary step toward greater transparency and accountability.60 Providing context and disclaimers about potential data inaccuracies, as WVOMHST does, is a good practice that should be maintained and strengthened.14

Works cited

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  2. Consensus Coal Production Forecast for West Virginia: 2017, accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.marshall.edu/cber/files/2021/04/2017-WV-Consensus-Coal-Production-Forecast-Final-9-5-17.pdf

  3. 100th Anniversary - West Virginia Coal Association, accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.wvcoal.com/docs/Coal-Facts-2015.pdf

  4. ENERGY PLAN 2013-2017, accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.energywv.org/assets/files/EnergyPlan/ENERGY_5year_Plan_ALL-2013-2017.pdf

  5. Coal Mine Employment by State* (CY 2009 - 2015) - MSHA, accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.msha.gov/sites/default/files/Data_Reports/Charts/Coal_Employment_by_State_and_County_CY09to15.pdf

  6. Boone, Logan, and Mingo Counties, West Virginia | Archive | Case Studies, accessed June 28, 2025, https://archive.revenuedata.doi.gov/archive/case-studies/boone-logan-and-mingo/

  7. West Virginia Runs—and Falls—on Coal - The Perspective, accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.theperspective.se/2025/01/31/upf/west-virginia-runs-and-falls-on-coal/

  8. Pocahontas County, WV | Data USA, accessed June 28, 2025, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/pocahontas-county-wv

  9. Plenty of Problems for Proposed Experimental Mine - West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.wvhighlands.org/article/plenty-of-problems-for-proposed-experimental-mine/

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