The Turks, who were comparatively few in number,
were politically more powerful than any other group although during the
century their power was greatly diminished in some of the states.^ The
Moors constituted an important element, one which had been in¬ creased
by the conquest of Granada in 1492 and by an¬ other expulsion in 1609.
The members of this body were, throughout a large portion of Barbary,
denied extensive participation in governmental affairs but they engaged
quite actively in trade. In the latter respect, however, they appear to
have been outstripped by the Jews, who, al¬ though treated with
contempt, and compelled to suffer severely at times, nevertheless
exerted a tremendously im¬ portant economic and political influence.®
Estimates of the number of residents in Barbary during this early period
are hardly more than rough conjectures. An English officer, who served
in Morocco near the close of the eighteenth century, was of the opinion
that although no accurate estimate of the number of inhabitants of that
kingdom could be obtained, there were at that time not more than two
million. In 1796 Joel Barlow, United States agent at Algiers, wrote to
the Secretary of State that there were between two and three millions of
people within the Algerine dominions. The population of the capital city of Tunis is reported to have been larger about this time than the Algerine capital, and the city of Tripoli smaller.®
-
Page 4
the Turkish soldiers were at least theoretically given
an equal vote, but their attitude towards a candidate for the Deyship
was probably greatly influenced by that of the most prominent officers,
about forty of whom served as the Dey’s Divan, or council. In the course
of time, however, the Dey acquired such an ascendancy that this
council’s powers dwindled almost to the vanishing point.
In 1796 Joel
Barlow wrote that the Algerine government “has now become a
simple monarchy. The Divan has not been assembled for some years, and
the Dey is subject to no other check than that which arises from the
necessity he is under to distribute foreign presents, and sometimes his
own money, among the principal officers, to secure him¬ self from
assassination and to prevent mutinies.”® As his chief support in civil
and in military affairs, the Dey relied upon a body of about twelve
thousand Turks, who were natives of the Near East, and who were as
abandoned a set of miscreants as ever policed a large dominion. Any
member of this corps of adventurers was eligible to the highest office
in Algiers.^®
-
Page 7
In 1786 John Lamb, the first
envoy sent by the United States to Algiers, wrote to Jeflferson that the
Algerine fleet at that time consisted of “nine xebecks and
ten row galleys from 36 to 8 guns; the largest is manned with about 400
men, and so on in proportion.”^
Two years later an English officer who
was serving in a diplomatic capacity in Morocco wrote that the Moroccan
navy “now consists of about twenty vessels, the largest of twenty
guns.”^^ This correspondent, it might be remarked, appeared a bit
perturbed about the size of the Imperial fleet and suggested that the
English government “might, and perhaps should, help him [the Emperor]
to double that force, since he likes it. He cannot hurt you much; but he
may be a proper checque on your enemies.”
Nor, at the close of the
American Revolution, was the navy of Tunis a formidable one. By 1799,
however, William Eaton, who was the American consul to that regency,
reported that the Tunisian naval force then consisted of ninety-four
armed vessels with nine hundred and twentyeight guns, and eighty-eight
swivels; “the whole manned by upwards of eight thousand men.”
Immediately prior to writing thus to the Secretary of State, Eaton had
been informed by the Swedish Consul, “the oldest and perhaps the best
informed in the Kingdom,” that twenty years earlier, Tunis could send
out no more than nine cruisers. By 1800 the Pasha of Tripoli had
succeeded in collecting a maritime force of only eleven vessels,
mounting hardly more than a hundred guns.^^
-
Page 8
It was not from peaceful commerce, however, that the
Barbary chieftains received their most important revenues. Piracy was
the foundation of their economic, and also of their political, system.
So important a part did marauding play in their affairs that they were
loath to have treaties with many European States at any given time.^® An
English officer, on a diplomatic mission to Morocco in 1788, stated
that the Emperor had recently become so unpopular by forming a number of
treaties with Christian powers that it had “required a great deal of
money, and all the arts of a most artful and despotic prince, to make
them go down with the people” and it was recorded that on at least one
occasion there was a debate in the Algerine
-
Page 12
The precise nature of these various contributions may
be shown more clearly by a few illustrations drawn from eighteenth and
early nineteenth century history.
In 1786 an American captive in
Algiers wrote to Jefferson as fol¬ lows: “The English, French, Dutch,
Danes, and Swedes, and I may say all nations are tributary to them [the
Algerines].’’®® At almost the same time an American in Algiers stated
that although England boasted of having a better treaty with the
Algerines than any other country, she had nevertheless paid to Algiers
presents to the value of twenty-eight thousand pounds since 1769.
In
1783 John Adams wrote that the Grand Pensionary of Holland had told him
“that the Republic paid annually to Algiers a hundred thousand
dollars.”^^ The large sum proposed by Spain to Algiers for peace in 1786
left Jefferson and Adams “with little hope” of meeting Algerine
demands.
In 1790 it was estimated that Spain maintained her peace
with Algiers between 1785 and 1790 at an expense of four and one-half
millions of dollars. In 1802 the Algerines reduced the Spaniards to the
following terms: to pay sixty thousand dollars directly to the Dey; to
send each new consul with presents worth forty-two thousand dol¬ lars ;
to renounce claims to three Spanish vessels and car¬ goes ; and to give
the Dey’s ministry and directory thirty thousand dollars.^® The
Venetians on one occasion agreed to pay fifty thousand ducats down and
five thousand each
-
Page 14
“ A. M, Broadley, Tunis, Past and Present, p. 82. In
1802 the Bey “disgraced” the Danish consul because the latter offered
the former ‘‘some arms mounted in copper instead of gold.’* About the
same time thirty leading Spanish subjects were in prison because two
gunboats presented to the Bey did not contain as many guns as he
desired. In 1796 when it was reported that the British had sunk an Algerine vessel, the Dey called the British consul before him and threatened to “shorten him a head.”
-
Page 16
•*F. Wharton (ed.). Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the U. 8,, VI, Salva to Franklin (Algiers) April 1,
1783: “The politics of certain European powers do not restrain them from
paying tribute to enjoy peace, they make use of these human harpies as a
terror to the belligerent nations, whose commerce they chain to the car
of Algerine piracy.” (Hereafter referred to as Rev. Dipl. Corr. U. 8.)
-
Page 39
® f7. fir. Dipl Corr., Ill, 82,* Lamb to Jefferson, May 20, 1786. This Algerine
minister observed that the exorbitant sum demanded for the Americans
“was only to put a more modest face on the price they [the Algerines]
intend to make the Spaniards pay for their people.”
-
Page 39
He spoke only one language, the English, and seems to
have had no previous experience in diplomatic affairs. He became
embroiled in a dispute with the Spanish minister. Count d’Expilly, while
in Algiers, and was charged with having made threats that if Spain did
not aid him in settling the Algerine negotiations
satisfactorily, the United States would seize Spanish territory in
America. Further¬ more, he gave the Americans in Algiers the impression
that he would return within a few months with the ransom money which the
Dey demanded. For criticism of Lamb’s conduct while in Algiers, see a
letter which they wrote to Adams, Feb. 13, 1787, U. 8, Dipl Corr,,
Page 43
The collapse of the Algerine and
Tripolitan negotiations left the commissioners in doubt as to what
course they should pursue. Jefferson favored the sending of Barclay to
treat with the Dey, and urged upon Adams and Congress the expediency of
that course. The cost of such a mission, he wrote, would not be great.
Barclay should be able to obtain a considerable amount of information;
Spain, hav¬ ing now made its peace with Algiers, might provide aid as it
had in the Moroccan negotiations. Finally, the com¬ missioners would be
shielded from the charge that they had made a good appointment in the
case of Morocco but a bad one in that of Algiers.^® In these opinions
Adams did not concur, expressing a conviction that ‘‘no good can result
at present from further attempts at Algiers.”^®
-
Page 43
In the meantime Adams and Jefferson had been con
sidering the formation of a treaty with Turkey as a step toward
obtaining one with Algiers.Count d’Expilly, the Spanish negotiator at
Algiers, reported the Dey as having publicly announced “that he would
treat with no power about peace that had not previously made it with the
Sublime Porte.”
This coincided with statements made by Florida
Blanca,^® and with a provision of the recently formed Spanish-Algerine treaty.®®
-
Page 47
ALGERINE AND TRIPOLITAN PROBLEMS 47Page 48
-
^ Ibid,, II, 290. Am. Commissioners to Vergennes, March 28, 1786. The Franco-Algerine
treaty of April, 1684, would soon expire. The American Commissioners
thought that “Congress would probably prefer joining in a war rather
than treat with nations who so bar¬ barously and inhumanly commence
hostilities against others who have done them no injury.”
-
The complete failure of the foregoing attempts to solve the Algerine
and Tripolitan problem cannot properly be attributed to any lack of
ability on the part of Adams and Jefferson. They had labored tirelessly;
they had studied the problem from all angles; and they had urged the
em¬ ployment of every expedient which gave any promise of success. They
had been unsuccessful primarily because of the lack of funds. Without
money treaties could not be obtained either amicably or by force from
the piratical states.®® As early as July, 1786, Adams had become con¬
-
Page n69
about the same time appointed to serve as Humphreys’
secretary. The instructions given the latter were essentially the same
as those sent to Jones and Barclay. One change was made relative to
payments in naval stores. Humphreys was informed that if the Algerine
government refused to make peace or to release the prisoners on any
conditions other than the delivery of such stores, he might agree to an
initial payment in that form and reserve “the right to make the
subsequent annual payments in money.Due to the inability of Cutting to
obtain early transportation from London to Portugal, Humphreys did not
receive his commission until September.
-
Page n69
Soon after Cutting reached Lisbon, Humphreys was ready
to depart for Algiers. On September 13 he wrote to the Secretary of
State that he had chartered a Swedish vessel to convey him to Gibraltar,
and that his eagerness to start would not permit him to be detained one
moment longer than was absolutely necessary.^® A few days later he and
Cutting reached Gibraltar. Here they were engaged in unpacking and
selecting presents, which Barclay had bought, when they learned that a
Portuguese-Algerine truce had been formed.
-
Page n70
Take every precaution against Algerine
depredations in case the Portuguese squadron permitted the corsairs to
pass the Straits. This communication caused Humphreys to interview the
Portuguese Secretary of State, who stated that he had heard nothing
about a proposed peace with Algiers, and that the report might therefore
be dismissed as being without foundation.^® In spite of this comforting
assurance, however, the dreaded truce was formed, through the agency of
William Logie, the English consul at Algiers.^
When called upon to
explain his action, Logie’s answer was that the Portuguese Court had
“earnestly” requested him to form the truce.^^ An investigation made by
Thomas Pinckney in London elicited from Lord Gren¬ ville the statement
that the Court of Portugal had applied to the English government to
procure for Portugal a peace with the Algerines, “and that Mr. Logie had
been in¬ structed to use his endeavors to effect this purpose.” Logie,
unable to establish a peace, had concluded a truce which was, according
to Grenville, “particularly ad¬ vantageous” for England, inasmuch as it
would enable the Portuguese fleet to cooperate with that of England
“against their common enemy.” By rendering what was conceived to be this
service to a good ally, the minister
-
Page n71
Ibid., Ill, Pinckney to Sec. of State, Dec. 17, 1793.
This com¬ munication ran in part as follows: “He [the Portuguese envoy]
told me expressly that the truce had been made by the British consul
without the knowledge of his [the Portuguese] court, and that the first
information they received of it was from the Algerine
cruizers themselves when they met the Portuguese fleet, which was
preparing to attack them, when they produced the truce expedited by Mr.
Logie.”
-
Page 60
made by a Mr. Sloan, who was in Algiers at the time the
truce was being negotiated. He said that he was present at some of the
meetings between Logie and the Dey, and that he had seen the former
giving instructions to the Algerine captains as to where
they should cruise in order to capture American vessels. Logie,
according to Sloan, guaranteed that the Algerines could ‘‘catch a dozen”
of these within a month “provided they would follow his direction.”^*^
-
Page 60
In spite of a warning issued by Humphreys to Americans engaged in shipping, and despite the steps taken to secure convoys
for vessels in European ports,^® the truce proved most disastrous.
Insurance rates on American ship¬ ping immediately leaped from ten to
thirty per cent.
Furthermore, the Algerine cruise beyond
the Straits netted the corsairs at least eleven American vessels during
the months of October and November and increased the num ber of
American prisoners to one hundred and nineteen.®^
-
Page 65
It would be preferable to pay Portugal to secure pro¬ tection for
American commerce; that seamen would be removed from productive
employment if a navy were formed; and that the Algerines would deal more
harshly with captured Americans if the United States showed a
disposition to fight.®® The advocates of the bill, on the other hand,
contended that the contemplated armament was large enough, or could be
made so without great difficulty. Reports from Algiers, it was said,
had shown that the number of Algerine vessels was not
large, and that they did not sail in fleets.
should it be
anticipated that other countries would interfere and attempt to thwart
the efforts of the Americans. The idea that friendly ports could not be
found in Europe was represented as absurd, and emphasis was placed on
the aid that Portugal had given in providing convoys for American
vessels since the formation of the Portuguese-Algerine
truce.
The ability of the United States to purchase a satisfactory peace
from Algiers was questioned, as was the expediency of such a course. It
was furthermore contended that pay ing the Portuguese to fight the
battles of the United States was not compatible with national dignity,
and that all sentiments of humanity called for Americans to secure the
release of their compatriots imprisoned at Algiers.®^
-
Page 67
can commerce in that sea would never be secure without
the use of a naval force, it had postponed the beginning of such an
armament until the country’s finances were improved; (b) while awaiting
this improvement it pro¬ posed to negotiate with the Barbary powers,
purchasing a peace at the expense, if necessary, of an annual tribute.
The administration had, accordingly, instructed its agents to negotiate a
treaty with Algiers, and in the early autumn of 1793 Humphreys had
started on a mission to that regency. (2) While these preparations were
being made Consul Logie had formed the Portuguese-Algerine
truce.
The evidence submitted above indicates that although the
Portuguese government had desired the cooperation of England in making
peace with Algiers, the project had been “in embryo” at the time the
truce was established: no agent had been appointed as mediator and no
under¬ standing had been arrived at between the English and Portuguese
governments relative to peace or an armistice. The English government
had, however, used the expression of desire on the part of the
Portuguese government to make peace with Algiers as one of the bases for
its instructions to Consul Logie.
That official had thereupon formed a
truce which was guaranteed by England and which would have imposed upon
Portugal a large financial obligation in the event of peace. Immediately
following the formation of the truce the corsairs had used a copy of it
as a pass¬ port into the Atlantic and had captured over one hundred
Americans. Although Logie and his superior officer. Lord
-
Page 68
in failing to issue a warning in order to reduce them
to a minimum. (3) The United States had, after the formation of the
disastrous truce, encountered another obstacle in the Dey’s refusal to
negotiate. The reasons which he had given for such a course were
American un¬ trustworthiness and the necessity of providing constant
employment for his corsairs. (4) Early in 1794 the United States
government had become sufficiently aroused by the Algerine
situation to authorize the construction of a small naval armament. The
measure was not, however, over¬ whelmingly supported in Congress. New
England representatives were, on the whole, its staunchest friends;
southern members were, with few exceptions, its enemies. It was passed
in the House by a majority of only eleven votes, and with the proviso
that in the event of peace with Algiers its operation should immediately
be suspended.
-
Page 72
$240,000, would go to the Dey
and his family, and that the total sum was $279,600 more than he had
been paid by the Dutch.^* The Dey agreed to accept the offer with a
proviso that the United States must pay an annuity in stores and provide
biennial presents “the same as paid by Holland, Sweden, and Denmark.” A few hours later adjustments were made which obligated the United
States to pay in cash a total sum of $642,500 and an annual tribute of
twelve thousand Algerine sequins ($21,600) in naval stores.^®
-
Page 72
Late in November Humphreys gave his approval to the
treaty, and on March 2, 1796, the Senate advised ratification. The
document contained twenty-two articles, the majority relating to
seizures and other molestations. Provision was made for furnishing
American vessels with passports within eighteen months after the
formation of the treaty. Foreign countries could not sell captured
American vessels in Algiers, but Americans were permitted to sell their
prizes in Algerine ports.Considerate treat ment was
guaranteed Americans who voluntarily or as a result of accident landed
in Algiers. Naval and military stores might enter Algerine
ports free of duty, but all other articles should be subject to the
duties paid by countries possessing treaties with Algiers. Articles
brought to Algiers for the American consul and his family should be duty
free. Slaves escaping to American vessels were to be “immediately
returned” to their Algerine masters. The Dey was to decide
disputes between his subjects and citizens of the United States in
Algiers; but in those be¬ tween United States’ citizens, the consul
should have jurisdiction.
-
Page 74
On April 2, the Dey publicly announced that within
eight days he would declare war against the United States; then at the
expiration of another thirty days he would begin to capture American
vessels.®® In order to postpone such an event for at least three months
Barlow promised that the United States would give to the Dey’s daughter a
ship of thirty-six guns, and to a Jewish broker named Bacri a present
of $18,000.
Barlow estimated the total expenditures for frigate and
commission at $53,000.®® In order to soothe the Dey still more, Barlow
proffered him a consular present of far greater value than that ordinarily given at Algiers.
The Dey hesitated to accept it because the
United States had not paid him for the treaty, but finally consented on
the ground that a distribution of the present would tend to stop
criticism on the part of many Algerine officers.^® He also
ordered Cathcart to go to Philadelphia to aid in the collection and
transportation of the promised presents. His reason for this, he said,
was a desire to protect the treaty from the attacks of its enemies; an
object which might be attained if it could be demonstrated that the
Americans were “more punctual and honest than other nations.”^^
-
Page 75
The captives were sent to Marseilles in an Algerine
ship, the “Fortune.” After they had been landed the vessel sailed away,
flying the American colors. It was cap¬ tured by the British who
claimed it on the basis of the Algerines’ having secured it as a prize.
Bacri and Com pany, the owners, estimated their loss at $40,000 and
pre¬ sented to Barlow a bill for that amount. The claimants contended
that the flag of any nation at peace with Algiers protected the Algerine
vessel and cargo over which it flew. Barlow, according to O’Brien, “had
no alternative but to entail this sum as a debt on the United
States.”^^
-
Page 76
In the relations between the United States and Algiers
during the years 1793 to 1797 Europeans played an im¬ portant part. The
activities of Logie, and his government’s approval of the Portuguese-Algerine
truce, have already been noted.®^ Portugal, after permitting an Al¬
gerine raid into the Atlantic, refused to ratify the truce and provided
convoys for American merchantmen. In April, 1794, she definitely renewed
the struggle against the corsairs.®^ This enraged the Dey who “damned”
Logie for forming the truce without Portugal’s consent and threatened to
declare war on England.®® This anger at the
-
Page 78
The confidence in the friendship of these two Europeans
that in 1796 the United States Government offered to P. E. Skjoldebrand
a consular commission.®® Cathcart wrote that the Danish and Venetian
agents at Algiers were fearful lest the formation of a treaty with the
United States would be followed by an Algerine war against
Den mark and Venice. They therefore sought to convince the Dey “that
the United States had neither the means nor the inclination to comply
with his demands,”®^
-
Page 81
managed their affairs with those Regencies.”^" His
refer¬ ence to Barbary was not here confined to Algiers. He might
properly, however, have added that the million dol¬ lar Algerine peace had increased exactions from the United States and Algiers over the period covered by
this chapter, one observes a number of significant results.
On the one
hand, American captives had been liberated; peace had been established
with the most formidable of the Barbary powers; the Algerine
ruler had promised to aid the United States in forming treaties with
Tripoli and Tunis; and there had been constructed a small naval arma¬
ment which provided greater security to American com¬ merce.
But, on the
other hand, the United States gov¬ ernment had paid a huge sum for
ransom and for the initial peace; it had made valuable concessions in
the form of presents not stipulated by the treaty; it had bound itself
to pay an annual tribute in naval stores which would be used for
piratical purposes. The magnitude of these concessions had stimulated
Tripolitan and Tunisian greed, and had alarmed European maritime states.
Finally, hav¬ ing purchased peace so dearly at Algiers, the new
republic had begun to treat with Tripoli and Tunis. Its hope for success
in these negotiations was based upon the good faith of a pirate and the
efficacy of bribes. Such had been the policy of the government which,
it was claimed, possessed “millions for defence, but not one cent for
tribute.”
-
-
Page 84
Obtaining a treaty from Tripoli was a more difficult
and expensive task. The young Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli, was extremely
militant, and apparently hoped to rival the Dey of Algiers in power.^^
In September, 1796, his corsairs brought to Tripoli two American
vessels. Happily, the brig “Sophia,” one of the vessels captured, with
O’Brien on board sailed under the protection of an Algerine
pass¬ port, and the Pasha ordered her released.^^ The incident resulted
in the Dey’s sending a very sharp letter to the Pasha, demanding that
he make peace with the United States for $40,000.^®
-
Page 87
The Dey at this juncture made war on Tunis, and in
December Barlow wrote exultantly that “fifty thousand ambassadors” had
been sent from Algiers to settle Ameri¬ can affairs in Tunis.®^ Although
the Dey asserted that his attack was for the sole purpose of securing a
treaty for the United States, it may reasonably be supposed that the
plundering of a shipwrecked Algerine vessel by Tunisians
was an important contributing factor.®® Within a very short time these
warlike measures were abandoned. The Bey made presents and “other
concessions”;®® whereupon the Dey withdrew his troops, assuring Barlow
at the time that the contest was only adjourned.^® “Thus,” wrote Barlow
in August, “ended the conquest of Tunis. I have heard not a word of it
since.
-
Page 94
In September, 1800, the United States frigate, “George
Washington,” reached Algiers, having been sent thither to make another
payment of tribute. The Dey, who was at the time in disfavor at
Constantinople, demanded that Captain William Bainbridge employ the
vessel in bearing an ambassador and certain presents to the Sultan. The
Captain and O’Brien at first refused, and for a time it seemed likely
that a British vessel would be used. In the end, however, the Dey
announced that his mind was “soured” against the British and that the
“George Wash¬ ington” must make the voyage in question. When O’Brien
refused to assume responsibility for such a measure, the Dey replied
that he would assume it. The American flag was then hauled down, the Algerine pennant was hoisted, and the first ship of the United States to reach Con-
-
At
Constantinople Bainbridge made a very favorable im pression and
received from the Turkish government a firman which guaranteed him
protection in all Turkish ports. By January 21 the “George Washington”
was again at Algiers but was anchored out of range of the Algerine
batteries.
The Dey asked Bainbridge to convey another messenger to
Constantinople, but the commander refused and would not place his vessel
within reach of the Algerines until the Dey promised to say nothing
more about the proposed voyage. When Bainbridge subsequently had an
interview with the Dey, the latter made new de¬ mands. At a critical
juncture the American produced his Turkish firman. From that moment he
was shown the greatest courtesy.^®
-
Page 105
His arbitrary
impressment of the “George Washington,” however, had constituted a
serious offence and had produced a strenuous protest from American
agents in Barbary. W^ith Tripoli war had be¬ come imminent. The Pasha’s
demands for an annual tribute and for freedom from Algerine
interposition had eventually caused Cathcart to issue a general
warning through American officials in Mediterranean ports.
The Bey of
Tunis had also threatened to begin hostilities unless he received
presents which had not been promised when the treaty was formed. To the
Bey and to the Pasha the United States had granted concessions in order
to preserve the peace. At the same time, however, preparations had been
made to oppose force with force. The latter measure was the most hopeful
thus far noted in the Barbary diplomacy of the United States.
It was an
act which acorded well with every sentiment of justice. It was the
result of mature deliberation extending over many years, during which
peaceful expedients had resulted in humilia¬ tion. Although it did not
constitute a declaration of complete independence from an age-old
system of extortion, it definitely foreshadowed the revolt.
-
Page 107
After leaving Gibraltar the Commodore proceeded to
Algiers. Here he found a considerable amount of dissatis faction on
account of non-payment of annuities. Consul O’Brien was certain that the
appearance of the American frigate at such an opportune time would have
a more beneficial effect upon the Dey than would the coming of a
storeship. Curiously enough, however, the consul did not think the time
propitious for negotiations with the Dey for a commutation of naval
stores to a money pay¬ ment.
The desirability of such a commutation had
been emphasized by the Secretary of State in his instructions to
O’Brien,^ and it would seem that, if the Dey had been greatly impressed
by the arrival of the American flag¬ ship, it would have been well to
seek immediately a modifi¬ cation of the stipulation. It would appear,
too, that O’Brien had brought little or no pressure to bear on the Dey
to make good his guarantee that the Pasha would abide by the treaty of
1796.® If any extenuation for this omission be required, it is to be
found in evidence which the Dey had already provided that his guarantee
was worthless.
In January, 1801, when Cathcart was sur¬ rounded by difficulties at Tripoli, the Dey wrote to Yusuf in the interest of the
United States; but inunediately there¬ after informed O’Brien that the
latter must pay him for this service.® In April the Dey despatched a
second letter yet in May the United States flag at Tripoli came down. By
July 22 a third letter had proved to be equally value¬ less, the reason
being, according to the Algerine ministry,
-
Page 113
Before all of Morris’s relief squadron reached the
Medi¬ terranean certain circumstances indicated that in Tripoli the war
was not popular. In December, 1801, Eaton re¬ ported that he had learned
from the Danish Commodore that the Tripolitans were eager for peace and
for “the restoration of their rightful sovereign, who is a mild man of
peaceful disposition.”^® In January the Algerine min¬ istry
proposed to Consul O’Brien that inasmuch as a Tripolitan envoy was then
at Algiers the time was auspicious to establish peace through Algerine
mediation. These advisers informed O’Brien, however, that the pro¬
posed negotiations would of necessity involve some ex¬ pense on the part
of the United States.
The consul replied that his government had “had
sufficient of the bad faith of Tripoli,” and would pay nothing for a
treaty of peace.®^ In March it was reported that there was a shortage of
provisions in Tripoli; that storms had wrecked a number of Tripolitan
vessels; that many Arabs within the Pasha’s dominions had rebelled; and
that the chief admiral had
-
Page 114
Similar despatches were sent from
Barbary during the succeeding months.®® In May the chief minister of
the Bey of Tunis approached Eaton with a proposal for Tunisian
mediation. Like the Algerine offer it was accompanied with a
request for money, to grant which Eaton considered as inadmissible. The
minister as¬ sured him that there could be nothing dishonorable about
giving a present to the government of Tripoli, particularly since it
could ‘‘not subsist without the generosity of . . . friends.” Eaton’s
answer was that the Pasha had by his actions forfeited his right to
American friendship; the matter was at this point permitted to drop.®^
-
Page 117
Under such circumstances it was not strange that the
Tripolitans succeeded in capturing an American mer chantman and its
crew of nine men. The vessel in question was the brig “Franklin,”
Captain Andrew Morris, seized off Cape Palos on June 17.
It was taken
to Algiers by its captors, who presented to the Dey some Christian and
negro slaves as presents. The Dey gave the Tripolitan captain a lecture
regarding the Pasha’s failure to re¬ main at peace with the United
States but about the same time ordered a cargo of wheat to be sent to
Tripoli.®® O’Brien requested the aid of the Algerine ministry in se curing the release of the brig and her crew but received slight encouragement. He then appealed to the Dey who
offered to pay the Tripolitan commander five thousand dollars as a
ransom for the prisoners. The officer replied that he had strict
instructions to return all prisoners to Tripoli; whereupon the Dey
announced that the “Frank¬ lin” and her crew must be removed from
Algiers.®^ On July 9, Eaton wrote that on the preceding day the brig and
her cargo had been auctioned off at Tunis but that the master and crew
were “destined for Tripoli.”
There they arrived July 19, and according
to Captain Morris’s account, entered the harbor “in view of a Swedish
and American frigate, who never made the least effort to obstruct our
progress when it was certainly in their power to capture or run the
pirate on shore before it was possible for them to be protected from
their batteries ... this trans¬ action was in open day in sight of
thousands amongst which the consuls of different nations can testify.”®®
Five of the prisoners, who were not Americans, were soon re¬ leased,
the remainder being held until October. They were then liberated as a
result of Algerine intervention, which cost the United States sixty-five hundred dollars.
-
Page 155
pert witling” who had combined to heap calumny upon the
administration for the wretched manner in which it had conducted the
war and had concluded peace.^ To this organ the treaty was entirely
satisfactory, as indicated by the statement that ‘‘Our captive
countrymen have been restored to the bosom of their country, peace has
been made on honorable terms ... We have got all we wanted.”^^ The
Aurora expressed unqualified approval of the treaty in the following
words: “Our conceptions have been realized—events speak for
themselves—the government has performed its duty, regardless of the
rhapsodies of its causeless enemies, or the perfidy of its pretended
friends.”^® On the other hand, certain New England news¬ papers seem to
have found little to be commended in the treaty.
The Boston Gazette was
unstinted in its denuncia¬ tion of the Intelligencer* s “whitewashing
comments [which] when carefully filtrated, and purged of their
meretricious colouring, turn out to be downright insults to the common
understanding of man.” The Boston Repertory held up to ridicule an
article which had recently appeared in the Richmond Enquirer; and the Salem
Register in commenting on the treaty, indulged in stric¬ tures which
were concluded with the remark: “We
-
Page 169
Lear learned about this incident from the
Dey, who nevertheless assured the Consul-General that the affair would
not disturb the good relationship which had so recently been
established.^® Here the matter tem¬ porarily rested, but on March 16,
1808, the Dey peremp¬ torily ordered Lear to pay him eighteen thousand
dollars for eight Algerine subjects who had lost their
lives as a result of the recapture of the “Mary Ann.’^ Lear refused to
make the payment, and, despite threats of personal en¬ slavement,
remained fixed in this determination until he was informed that Algerine
vessels had been ordered to make an attack upon American commerce.
Fearing that the cruise would be successful, he at length agreed to pay
the amount in question, but only on condition that the cruising orders
be recalled, and not repeated in the future.®®
-
Page 170
During the remainder of the period 1808 to 1812, there
were comparatively few alarming situations with which Lear had to deal.
In November, of the former year, Achmet Pasha was murdered by the Algerine
soldiery, and a successor, Ali Cogia, was chosen.®^ The new Dey
showed him¬ self well-disposed towards the United States; consequently,
during his brief reign no serious friction developed between the two
nations. But Ali displayed too little activity to be popular with the
soldiers, who, in characteristic fashion, strangled him, and elevated a
certain Hadji Ali, a popular Algerine official, to the
Dey ship.
The latter, for a number of years after his accession,
conducted himself in a friendly manner towards the United States.
Indeed, he had no cause for dissatisfaction inasmuch as he received the
-
But on August 25, the Algerines captured the brig Edwin,” of Salem,
and conveyed it to Algiers. The Captain, George C. Smith, and crew of
ten, after being stripped of their belongings, were set to hard labor on
the mole.
Their condition remained thus until eventually improved
through funds provided by Lear, certain American mer¬ chants at Cadiz,
and Mr. Norderling at Algiers. The Swedish Consul wrote, in April, 1813,
that the captives were more comfortably situated, a number of them
having been granted permission to reside with officials of other
countries. The condition of the remainder he described as
-
Page 176
The formation of peace with Great Britain afforded the United States an excellent opportunity to punish Algerine
avarice and treachery. Moreover, the fact that Algiers, possessing only
a small navy,^ was at war with the mari time states of Italy, Spain,
Holland, Prussia, Denmark, and Russia, made the time propitious for a
final account ing with the Dey.
On February 23,1815, President Madison, therefore, recommended to Congress a declaration of war, and on
March 2, that body authorized the equipping and use of such vessels of
the navy as the President might think necessary to wage effective
hostilities against Algiers.
-
Page 176
^Despatches, Tunis, IV, R. Keene to M. M. Noah, May 22, 1814. “The Algerine squadron,” wrote Keene, “is composed of four frigates, four corvettes, three sloops of war, a Greek prize ship and some terms Decatur’s forces were to proceed to Gibraltar,
Xre inquiry was to be made regarding the whereabouts of AlgerL cruisers.
If any had passed the Straits into the Atlantic, Decatur was to
endeavor to capture or de stroy them.
He was also instructed to declare
the city of Algiers blockaded, and after reaching the Algerine
capital, was to open negotiations with the Dey. A final admonition was
that ‘‘at whatever time the negotiation is opened, whether it be before,
or after proceeding to extremities, the conditions must be such as are
honorable to the United
-
Page 177
Decatur’s squadron arrived at Gibraltar on June 15, the Commodore having learned in the meantime that some Algerine
cruisers under the command of Reis Hammida had recently been in the
Atlantic but had returned to the Mediterranean.® Hoping to take them by
surprise, Decatur hastened onward to the locality in which it appeared
most likely that he would encounter Hammida. On June 17, the
“Constellation” sighted a frigate in the vicinity of Cape de Gat. It was
the Algerine Admiral’s flagship, the “Mashuda,” which
immediately headed for Algiers. Being rapidly overtaken, however, it
turned towards the Spanish coast, only to be intercepted by the
Americans and eventu¬ ally forced to surrender. Hammida and about thirty
of his men were killed in the engagement, while over four hun¬ dred
Algerines were taken prisoner. Four Americans lost their lives in the
encounter, three being killed by the burst¬ ing of a gun on board the
“Guerriere.”® Two days later, the American squadron discovered an Algerine brig, the
-
Page 178
The ruling Dey at the time of Decatur’s arrival at
Algiers was a man named Omar, who possessed great cour age and
determination. He had become Dey early in 1816 in consequence of a
revolution during which the Turkish soldiers had murdered Hadji Ali.
About the time Decatur’s forces reached Algiers, Omar’s navy consisted
of four frigates, five corvettes, one brig, a galley, and a number of
gunboats. The vessels were, on the whole,, however, poorly equipped and
manned.^® Moreover, the Algerine fortifica¬ tions were in a bad state of repair, and deficient with re¬ spect to the mounting and manning of guns.^^
-
Page 178
On June 29, Decatur displayed from the “Guerriere” a
fiag of truce and the Swedish flag, thereby indicating that he wished to
carry on negotiations through the Swedish Consul. The latter,
accompanied by the Algerine Captain of Marine, soon came aboard the “Guerriere,” where they were informed about the capture of the Algerine
frigate and brig, and the death of Hammida. The Captain of Marine
seemed deeply impressed; wished to learn on what terms the Americans
proposed to treat; and ex¬ pressed a desire that hostilities should
cease. Decatur and Shaler thereupon gave him a letter which President
Madi¬ son had written to the Dey. The official and Mr. Norderling went
ashore to deliver this message and to receive instruc¬ tions. The
following day they returned to the “Guerriere” with authorization to
negotiate. Decatur and Shaler then presented to them a draft of a
proposed treaty. This pro¬ vided for the abolition of tribute, the
release of American prisoners at Algiers, the payment of ten thousand
dollars as indemnification for the seizure of the ‘
Edwin, the
restoration of other American property then in the pos¬ session of the
Dey, and the treatment of captives, in the event of future hostilities,
as prisoners of war rather than as slaves. The Captain of Marine argued
that some of these conditions were unprecedented and expressed serious
doubts regarding their ratification by the Dey. He also sought to have
the captured Algerine vessels returned to his master, and,
after some deliberation, the American commissioners decided to grant his
request. The vessels, they concluded, would be of little value to the
United States; while their relinquishment would probably cause the Dey
to yield more readily to the demands incorporated in the draft of the
proposed treaty. Then came a request for a truce, to allow time for
deliberation regarding the treaty.
“The reply, the Commissioners
subsequently re¬ ported, was ‘Not a minute; if your squadron appears in
sight before the treaty is actually signed by the Dey, and the prisoners
sent off, ours will capture them.’ ” It was finally agreed, by way of
compromise, that hostilities would be suspended as soon as the boat,
displaying a white flag, should leave the mainland. The Swedish Consul
promised that the flag should not be displayed unless the treaty were
signed and the prisoners in the boat.
Within three hours after leaving
the “Guerriere” the boat was back with the prisoners and a copy of the
signed treaty on board. It was fortunate that the trip had been
completed so soon; other¬ wise, an Algerine corvette which had hove in sight would undoubtedly have been captured.^^
-
Page 180
Having concluded peace with Algiers, and having de¬ spatched two vessels from the squadron to convoy the Algerine
frigate and brig from Carthagena, Decatur de¬ cided to visit Tunis and
Tripoli. The United States had been having some diflSculty with these
regencies since early in 1815 because the Bey and the Pasha had
permitted British warships to retake prizes which the American privateer
“Abaellino” had brought into Timisian and Tripolitan ports.
Consul Noah
at Tunis, and Consul Richard B. Jones at Tripoli had protested to the
utmost against this violation of existing treaties, but to no avail;
the former’s remonstrances had been ridiculed, and the latter’s.
-
Page 182
Both officers were
most enthusiastically received by their countrymen.*® Ratification of
the treaty which Decatur and Shaler had dictated to the Dey was advised
by the Senate, Decem¬ ber 21, 1815, and five days later it was
proclaimed by the President. On January 22 following, the frigate
“Java,” commanded by Captain Oliver H. Perry, sailed from the United
States with the ratified document and with despatches for Consul-General
Shaler.
Perry reached Gibraltar on February 13 and about three weeks
later joined Commodore Shaw, who thereupon proceeded with his squadron
to Algiers. Between April 1 and April 4, six United States warships
anchored before the Algerine capi¬ tal, which, at the time,
was being visited by a British squad¬ ron under the command of Admiral
Lord Exmouth. The latter concluded negotiations with the Dey soon after
-
Page 184
An event which occurred in August at Algiers proved
advantageous to the United States. A large fleet, con¬ sisting of
British and Dutch warships under the command of Lord Exmouth, appeared
before the Algerine capital. During the course of a terrific bombardment which ensued, the Algerine
fleet was virtually destroyed; the marine section of the city was cut
to pieces; and great havoc was wrought elsewhere.®^ Concerning the
damage inflicted by the bombardment, Shaler made this entry in his
Journal:
-
Page 185
Upon receipt of these messages, the two commissioners
returned to Algiers, arriving there December 8, 1816. Be¬ cause of
stormy weather it did not seem expedient for Commodore Chauncey to go
ashore; consequently Shaler alone represented the United States in the
negotiations with the Dey. On December 9, the Dey was sent a letter
which constituted the commissioners’ ultimatum. It de¬ fended the
conduct of the United States with respect to the restored frigate and
brig; denied the Dey’s right to reject the treaty; refused recognition
of a provision in the Algerine copy of the treaty,
obligating the United States to make consular presents; and proposed a
modifi¬ cation of Article XVHI in order to give the United States
-
Page 189
After peace had been concluded with Algiers, O Brien
negotiated a treaty with Tripoli, and the following year (1797) Famin
concluded one with Tunis. These agree¬ ments involved smaller
concessions than did the Algerine peace, and were somewhat
comparable in that respect to the Moroccan treaty which Barclay had
formed and which James Simpson had, in 1795, renewed.
The treaty with
Tunis was more expensive than was that with Tripoli but was ultimately
of greater advantage to the United States. Neither the Bey nor the Pasha
was pleased with his bar¬ gain, particularly after they fully realized
what a magnifi¬ cent treaty the Dey had acquired. They, therefore,
almost constantly threatened to declare war against the United States,
and eventually the Pasha put his threats into execution.
-
Page 193
After the close of the War with Tripoli, the United
States continued to pay tribute to Algiers in accordance with the treaty
of 1796; but the spirit of resistance to imposition was becoming
mtensiHed in consequence of the contest with the Pasha, additional
demand, made by the Dey of Algiers, and numerous differences wdh
England_ The last-named dispute, culminatmg m the War of 1812 and the
Dey’s breaking of his treaty with the United States, eventually provided
the needed opportunity for becoming independent of the Barbary Powers.
In 1816 war was formally declared against Algiers, and two United States
naval squadrons were fitted out for Mediterranean service. One of
these, under the command of Commodore Decatur, soon captured two Algerine
cruisers, blockaded the city of Algiers, and secured an eminently
honorable treaty. Decatur thereupon proceeded to Tunis and Tripoli where
he collected indemnity from the Bey and Pasha for losses sustained when
British warships had seized prize vessels which Americans had taken
into Tunisian and Tripolitan ports. Within a short time after these
inci¬ dents occurred, the Dey of Algiers rejected the treaty which h^
had formed with the United States, but the de¬ struction wrought by
Exmouth’s forces in 1816, together with the presence of United States
warships at Algiers, resulted in the ruler’s ultimate ratification.
Thenceforth, disputes of consequence between the United States and
Barbary were at an end.
-
Page 194
For commercial and political reasons the English gov
ernment refused at the close of the Revolution to aid the United States
in securing protection from North African pirates. During the following
decade it pursued a policy which, if not helpful, appears to have placed
no additional obstacles in the way of America’s obtaining immunity from
piracy.
In 1793, however, there was formed the PortugueseAlgerine
truce which provided ample justification for pro¬ test. Although it
cannot be shown that the officials in England sought to injure the
United States by promoting the armistice, it seems almost beyond belief
that they failed to foresee any unfortunate consequences of the act. So
far as Consul Logie’s participation in the transaction is con¬ cerned it
should be noted that there is the testimony of one auditor to the
eifect that he had heard Logie instruct¬ ing the Algerine
captains how to capture at least a dozen American vessels. To say that
Logie was in that respect carrying out instructions from London is
unwarranted; but in justice to all parties concerned it may properly be
asserted that the action of both high and low officials in this affair
presents two alternative conclusions: the meas¬ ure was consciously
unfriendly or it was the result of stupidity. From 1794 until the close
of the war with Tripoli there was no recurrence of an incident of this
sort; in fact, English and American relations with respect to Barbary
were on the whole satisfactory.
There was some friction between naval
officers, and Cathcart on one occasion offered to fight a duel with
McDonough whom he charged with inciting war between the United States
and Tripoli. Preble, on the other hand, appears to have been on very
intimate terms with a number of prominent English officials, and Eaton
secured valuable assistance from Eng¬ lishmen in Egypt.^ During the
later period, when AngloAmerican relations became so strained, and were
finally broken off, Algerine dissatisfaction with the
United States received a stimulus from official English sources. The Dey
placed great confidence in the power of the British fleets.
-
Page 195
and in 1812 declared war against the United States. Three years later when Decatur’s squadron was at Algiers, an Algerine
minister said to the English Consul: “You told us that the Americans
would be swept from the seas in six months by your navy, and now they
make war upon us with some of your own vessels which they have taken.
-
Page 197
The Spanish government during the Confederation Period
showed a marked disposition to facilitate the formation of a treaty
between the United States and Morocco, and gave some evidence of a
desire to aid the former power at Algiers.
The fact that hundreds of
Spanish subjects were, during a considerable portion of the period, held
captive by the Dey is alone sufficient to prove that Spain had little
influence in shaping Algerine policies with respect to the
United States.
From 1787 until 1806, Spanish officials seem to have
participated only slightly in the Barbary affairs of the United States;
but during the course of the Tripolitan War, the Spanish consul at
Tripoli rendered some services which Lear regarded as quite
unsatisfactory; and Commodore Preble charged the Spanish government with
subsidizing the Pasha to the ex¬ tent of sending a number of
shipbuilders to aid him in naval construction.
-
Page 202
Moroccan rulers. Mohamet Pasha (d. 1791) and Hasan
Pasha (d. 1798) were especially aggressive. The former steadfastly
refused to give up the crews of the “Dauphin” and “Maria,” and in this
course his successor also per¬ sisted. Hasan Pasha, however, was far
more successful in his plundering than was Mohamet Pasha. He captured
over one hundred Americans and secured from the United States a million
dollar treaty. Pleased with his acquisition, he promised to aid the
United States in forming satisfac¬ tory treaties with Tunis and Tripoli.
But fulfillment was a different matter; the conquest of Tunis
evaporated in thin air, and the aid given at Tripoli was at best
question¬ able with respect to beneficial results.
The rule of Hasan’s
successor, Mustapha, was characterized by the heaping of further
indignities upon the United States: the impress¬ ment of the “George
Washington,” the refusal to receive Cathcart, the detention of funds
sent to effect a commu¬ tation of stipulated payments of tribute, and
the requisi¬ tion of presents not promised in the treaty. Nor did
Mustapha exert himself to make effective the Algerine
guarantee that the Pasha of Tripoli would abide by the treaty of 1796.
In view of all these circumstances it is not strange that O’Brien wrote
sadly: “As to keeping the peace on honorable or equitable terms—these
words have meanings which cannot be well translated at Algiers.”
-
Page 213
-
History of the Barbary States tn General. Salem, 1806. Primarily useful for background of American relations
-
Page 216
Barlow, Joel, 2; description of Algerine government, 4; goes to Algiers, 73; difficulties, 74; borrows money from Bacri, 76; seeks Algerine aid in dealing with Tripoli and Tunis, 76; leaves Algiers, 92; correspon¬ dence cited, 70-92.
-
Page 217
Commerce, American, in the Mediterranean, prior to the
Revolution, 17-19; protection for sought, 20-24; made safer, 34-35;
injury inflicted upon, 4647; protected by Portuguese, 62-63; opinions
regarding safety of, 78; increase of, 101; extensive during War with
Tripoli, 116-17; defenseless, 167; Algerine menace to, 169; attacked by England and Al¬ giers, 172-73.
-
Page 217
Congress, takes first steps in dealing with Barbary
States, 20; seeks French aid, 22; commis¬ sions Adams, Jefferson, and
Franklin to form treaties with Barbary, 27-28; reports sent to, 28;
thanks King of Spain for services, 28; makes appropria¬ tions for
Barbary negotiations, 34; Tripolitan question referred to, 42; fails to
support pro¬ posal to form league against piracy, 60; appropriates money
for negotiations with Algiers, 66; seeks aid from Netherlands, 64;
debates of regarding Por¬ tuguese-Algerine truce, 62-63;
-
Page 217
Corsairs, of Barbary, extent of depredations, 9; Algerine, seize Americans, 37; advisability of waging war against, 47; cap¬ ture Americans, 60; Tripolitan, seize American vessels, 84.
-
Page 220
Hammida, Algerine admiral, 177.
-
Page 220
Humphreys, David, given secre¬ tarial position, 28; U. S. min¬ ister to Portugal, 66; Algerine
mission, 67; warning to Ameri¬ cans, 60; abandons mission to Algiers,
61; instructions to, 69; returns to America, 70; goes to Europe with new
in structions, 70-71; approves treaty formed with Tunis, 88. sends
O’Brien to London, 73; secures credit in London, 7476; approves treaty
formed with Tripoli, 86; approves treaty formed with Tunis, 88.
-
Page 221
“Mashuda,” Algerine cruiser, captured by Americans, 177; taken to Carthagena, 178; re¬ turned to Algerines, 179.
-
Page 222
Newspapers, American, on Por¬ tuguese-Algerine truce, 63-64; on U. S. treaty with Tripoli, 164-60.
-
Page 224
Souza, Luiz Pinto de, Portuguese minister, on PortugueseAlgerine truce, 69.
-------------------------------------------
The Christian Monitor 1817-02-01: Vol 2 Iss 11
Page 165
The followup narrative was committed to writing by an
aged clenr. eyman in Virginia, toll, is communicated tor publication by
a missionary of known character. Its authenticity may be relied on.— lt
is introduced by the writer with the ftollowing paragraphs. “I have long
been of opinion, that even the short account I am able to give of. Salem the Algerine,
is worth preserving; and suppose that no person now living: is able to
give so full an account of i as myself, nos having had the same means of
information. WI en I had committed this account of Salem to writing, I
thought it not improper to add that of the Negro, in Henrico, because it
bears in one respect, a considerable resemblance to the other.
