The Good Samaritan of Augusta County

 

 

The Diplomatic Relations Of The United States With The Barbary Powers 1776-1816

• The Turks, who were comparatively few in number, were politically more powerful than any other group although during the century their power was greatly diminished in some of the states.^ The Moors constituted an important element, one which had been in¬ creased by the conquest of Granada in 1492 and by an¬ other expulsion in 1609. 

  The members of this body were, throughout a large portion of Barbary, denied extensive participation in governmental affairs but they engaged quite actively in trade. In the latter respect, however, they appear to have been outstripped by the Jews, who, al¬ though treated with contempt, and compelled to suffer severely at times, nevertheless exerted a tremendously im¬ portant economic and political influence.®

   Estimates of the number of residents in Barbary during this early period are hardly more than rough conjectures. An English officer, who served in Morocco near the close of the eighteenth century, was of the opinion that although no accurate estimate of the number of inhabitants of that kingdom could be obtained, there were at that time not more than two million. In 1796 Joel Barlow, United States agent at Algiers, wrote to the Secretary of State that there were between two and three millions of people within the Algerine dominions. The population of the capital city of Tunis is reported to have been larger about this time than the Algerine capital, and the city of Tripoli smaller.®

   

• Page 4

  the Turkish soldiers were at least theoretically given an equal vote, but their attitude towards a candidate for the Deyship was probably greatly influenced by that of the most prominent officers, about forty of whom served as the Dey’s Divan, or council. In the course of time, however, the Dey acquired such an ascendancy that this council’s powers dwindled almost to the vanishing point. 

  In 1796 Joel Barlow wrote that the Algerine government “has now become a simple monarchy. The Divan has not been assembled for some years, and the Dey is subject to no other check than that which arises from the necessity he is under to distribute foreign presents, and sometimes his own money, among the principal officers, to secure him¬ self from assassination and to prevent mutinies.”® As his chief support in civil and in military affairs, the Dey relied upon a body of about twelve thousand Turks, who were natives of the Near East, and who were as abandoned a set of miscreants as ever policed a large dominion. Any member of this corps of adventurers was eligible to the highest office in Algiers.^®

• Page 7

  In 1786 John Lamb, the first envoy sent by the United States to Algiers, wrote to Jeflferson that the Algerine fleet at that time consisted of “nine xebecks and ten row galleys from 36 to 8 guns; the largest is manned with about 400 men, and so on in proportion.”^

  Two years later an English officer who was serving in a diplomatic capacity in Morocco wrote that the Moroccan navy “now consists of about twenty vessels, the largest of twenty guns.”^^ This correspondent, it might be remarked, appeared a bit perturbed about the size of the Imperial fleet and suggested that the English government “might, and perhaps should, help him [the Emperor] to double that force, since he likes it. He cannot hurt you much; but he may be a proper checque on your enemies.”

   Nor, at the close of the American Revolution, was the navy of Tunis a formidable one. By 1799, however, William Eaton, who was the American consul to that regency, reported that the Tunisian naval force then consisted of ninety-four armed vessels with nine hundred and twentyeight guns, and eighty-eight swivels; “the whole manned by upwards of eight thousand men.” Immediately prior to writing thus to the Secretary of State, Eaton had been informed by the Swedish Consul, “the oldest and perhaps the best informed in the Kingdom,” that twenty years earlier, Tunis could send out no more than nine cruisers. By 1800 the Pasha of Tripoli had succeeded in collecting a maritime force of only eleven vessels, mounting hardly more than a hundred guns.^^

• Page 8

  It was not from peaceful commerce, however, that the Barbary chieftains received their most important revenues. Piracy was the foundation of their economic, and also of their political, system. So important a part did marauding play in their affairs that they were loath to have treaties with many European States at any given time.^® An English officer, on a diplomatic mission to Morocco in 1788, stated that the Emperor had recently become so unpopular by forming a number of treaties with Christian powers that it had “required a great deal of money, and all the arts of a most artful and despotic prince, to make them go down with the people” and it was recorded that on at least one occasion there was a debate in the Algerine

• Page 12

  The precise nature of these various contributions may be shown more clearly by a few illustrations drawn from eighteenth and early nineteenth century history.

   In 1786 an American captive in Algiers wrote to Jefferson as fol¬ lows: “The English, French, Dutch, Danes, and Swedes, and I may say all nations are tributary to them [the Algerines].’’®® At almost the same time an American in Algiers stated that although England boasted of having a better treaty with the Algerines than any other country, she had nevertheless paid to Algiers presents to the value of twenty-eight thousand pounds since 1769.

  In 1783 John Adams wrote that the Grand Pensionary of Holland had told him “that the Republic paid annually to Algiers a hundred thousand dollars.”^^ The large sum proposed by Spain to Algiers for peace in 1786 left Jefferson and Adams “with little hope” of meeting Algerine demands.

  In 1790 it was estimated that Spain maintained her peace with Algiers between 1785 and 1790 at an expense of four and one-half millions of dollars. In 1802 the Algerines reduced the Spaniards to the following terms: to pay sixty thousand dollars directly to the Dey; to send each new consul with presents worth forty-two thousand dol¬ lars ; to renounce claims to three Spanish vessels and car¬ goes ; and to give the Dey’s ministry and directory thirty thousand dollars.^® The Venetians on one occasion agreed to pay fifty thousand ducats down and five thousand each

• Page 14

  “ A. M, Broadley, Tunis, Past and Present, p. 82. In 1802 the Bey “disgraced” the Danish consul because the latter offered the former ‘‘some arms mounted in copper instead of gold.’* About the same time thirty leading Spanish subjects were in prison because two gunboats presented to the Bey did not contain as many guns as he desired. In 1796 when it was reported that the British had sunk an Algerine vessel, the Dey called the British consul before him and threatened to “shorten him a head.”

• Page 16

  •*F. Wharton (ed.). Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. 8,, VI, Salva to Franklin (Algiers) April 1, 1783: “The politics of certain European powers do not restrain them from paying tribute to enjoy peace, they make use of these human harpies as a terror to the belligerent nations, whose commerce they chain to the car of Algerine piracy.” (Hereafter referred to as Rev. Dipl. Corr. U. 8.)

• Page 39

  ® f7. fir. Dipl Corr., Ill, 82,* Lamb to Jefferson, May 20, 1786. This Algerine minister observed that the exorbitant sum demanded for the Americans “was only to put a more modest face on the price they [the Algerines] intend to make the Spaniards pay for their people.”

• Page 39

  He spoke only one language, the English, and seems to have had no previous experience in diplomatic affairs. He became embroiled in a dispute with the Spanish minister. Count d’Expilly, while in Algiers, and was charged with having made threats that if Spain did not aid him in settling the Algerine negotiations satisfactorily, the United States would seize Spanish territory in America. Further¬ more, he gave the Americans in Algiers the impression that he would return within a few months with the ransom money which the Dey demanded. For criticism of Lamb’s conduct while in Algiers, see a letter which they wrote to Adams, Feb. 13, 1787, U. 8, Dipl Corr,,

• Page 43

  The collapse of the Algerine and Tripolitan negotiations left the commissioners in doubt as to what course they should pursue. Jefferson favored the sending of Barclay to treat with the Dey, and urged upon Adams and Congress the expediency of that course. The cost of such a mission, he wrote, would not be great. Barclay should be able to obtain a considerable amount of information; Spain, hav¬ ing now made its peace with Algiers, might provide aid as it had in the Moroccan negotiations. Finally, the com¬ missioners would be shielded from the charge that they had made a good appointment in the case of Morocco but a bad one in that of Algiers.^® In these opinions Adams did not concur, expressing a conviction that ‘‘no good can result at present from further attempts at Algiers.”^®

• Page 43

  In the meantime Adams and Jefferson had been con sidering the formation of a treaty with Turkey as a step toward obtaining one with Algiers.Count d’Expilly, the Spanish negotiator at Algiers, reported the Dey as having publicly announced “that he would treat with no power about peace that had not previously made it with the Sublime Porte.”

  This coincided with statements made by Florida Blanca,^® and with a provision of the recently formed Spanish-Algerine treaty.®®

• Page 47

  ALGERINE AND TRIPOLITAN PROBLEMS 47Page 48

• ^ Ibid,, II, 290. Am. Commissioners to Vergennes, March 28, 1786. The Franco-Algerine treaty of April, 1684, would soon expire. The American Commissioners thought that “Congress would probably prefer joining in a war rather than treat with nations who so bar¬ barously and inhumanly commence hostilities against others who have done them no injury.”

• The complete failure of the foregoing attempts to solve the Algerine and Tripolitan problem cannot properly be attributed to any lack of ability on the part of Adams and Jefferson. They had labored tirelessly; they had studied the problem from all angles; and they had urged the em¬ ployment of every expedient which gave any promise of success. They had been unsuccessful primarily because of the lack of funds. Without money treaties could not be obtained either amicably or by force from the piratical states.®® As early as July, 1786, Adams had become con¬

• Page n69

  about the same time appointed to serve as Humphreys’ secretary. The instructions given the latter were essentially the same as those sent to Jones and Barclay. One change was made relative to payments in naval stores. Humphreys was informed that if the Algerine government refused to make peace or to release the prisoners on any conditions other than the delivery of such stores, he might agree to an initial payment in that form and reserve “the right to make the subsequent annual payments in money.Due to the inability of Cutting to obtain early transportation from London to Portugal, Humphreys did not receive his commission until September.

• Page n69

  Soon after Cutting reached Lisbon, Humphreys was ready to depart for Algiers. On September 13 he wrote to the Secretary of State that he had chartered a Swedish vessel to convey him to Gibraltar, and that his eagerness to start would not permit him to be detained one moment longer than was absolutely necessary.^® A few days later he and Cutting reached Gibraltar. Here they were engaged in unpacking and selecting presents, which Barclay had bought, when they learned that a Portuguese-Algerine truce had been formed.

• Page n70

  Take every precaution against Algerine depredations in case the Portuguese squadron permitted the corsairs to pass the Straits. This communication caused Humphreys to interview the Portuguese Secretary of State, who stated that he had heard nothing about a proposed peace with Algiers, and that the report might therefore be dismissed as being without foundation.^® In spite of this comforting assurance, however, the dreaded truce was formed, through the agency of William Logie, the English consul at Algiers.^

  When called upon to explain his action, Logie’s answer was that the Portuguese Court had “earnestly” requested him to form the truce.^^ An investigation made by Thomas Pinckney in London elicited from Lord Gren¬ ville the statement that the Court of Portugal had applied to the English government to procure for Portugal a peace with the Algerines, “and that Mr. Logie had been in¬ structed to use his endeavors to effect this purpose.” Logie, unable to establish a peace, had concluded a truce which was, according to Grenville, “particularly ad¬ vantageous” for England, inasmuch as it would enable the Portuguese fleet to cooperate with that of England “against their common enemy.” By rendering what was conceived to be this service to a good ally, the minister

• Page n71

  Ibid., Ill, Pinckney to Sec. of State, Dec. 17, 1793. This com¬ munication ran in part as follows: “He [the Portuguese envoy] told me expressly that the truce had been made by the British consul without the knowledge of his [the Portuguese] court, and that the first information they received of it was from the Algerine cruizers themselves when they met the Portuguese fleet, which was preparing to attack them, when they produced the truce expedited by Mr. Logie.”

• Page 60

  made by a Mr. Sloan, who was in Algiers at the time the truce was being negotiated. He said that he was present at some of the meetings between Logie and the Dey, and that he had seen the former giving instructions to the Algerine captains as to where they should cruise in order to capture American vessels. Logie, according to Sloan, guaranteed that the Algerines could ‘‘catch a dozen” of these within a month “provided they would follow his direction.”^*^

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  In spite of a warning issued by Humphreys to Americans engaged in shipping, and despite the steps taken to secure convoys for vessels in European ports,^® the truce proved most disastrous. Insurance rates on American ship¬ ping immediately leaped from ten to thirty per cent.

  Furthermore, the Algerine cruise beyond the Straits netted the corsairs at least eleven American vessels during the months of October and November and increased the num ber of American prisoners to one hundred and nineteen.®^

• Page 65

  It would be preferable to pay Portugal to secure pro¬ tection for American commerce; that seamen would be removed from productive employment if a navy were formed; and that the Algerines would deal more harshly with captured Americans if the United States showed a disposition to fight.®® The advocates of the bill, on the other hand, contended that the contemplated armament was large enough, or could be made so without great difficulty. Reports from Algiers, it was said, had shown that the number of Algerine vessels was not large, and that they did not sail in fleets. 

  should it be anticipated that other countries would interfere and attempt to thwart the efforts of the Americans. The idea that friendly ports could not be found in Europe was represented as absurd, and emphasis was placed on the aid that Portugal had given in providing convoys for American vessels since the formation of the Portuguese-Algerine truce. 

  The ability of the United States to purchase a satisfactory peace from Algiers was questioned, as was the expediency of such a course. It was furthermore contended that pay ing the Portuguese to fight the battles of the United States was not compatible with national dignity, and that all sentiments of humanity called for Americans to secure the release of their compatriots imprisoned at Algiers.®^

• Page 67

  can commerce in that sea would never be secure without the use of a naval force, it had postponed the beginning of such an armament until the country’s finances were improved; (b) while awaiting this improvement it pro¬ posed to negotiate with the Barbary powers, purchasing a peace at the expense, if necessary, of an annual tribute. The administration had, accordingly, instructed its agents to negotiate a treaty with Algiers, and in the early autumn of 1793 Humphreys had started on a mission to that regency. (2) While these preparations were being made Consul Logie had formed the Portuguese-Algerine truce.

   The evidence submitted above indicates that although the Portuguese government had desired the cooperation of England in making peace with Algiers, the project had been “in embryo” at the time the truce was established: no agent had been appointed as mediator and no under¬ standing had been arrived at between the English and Portuguese governments relative to peace or an armistice. The English government had, however, used the expression of desire on the part of the Portuguese government to make peace with Algiers as one of the bases for its instructions to Consul Logie. 

  That official had thereupon formed a truce which was guaranteed by England and which would have imposed upon Portugal a large financial obligation in the event of peace. Immediately following the formation of the truce the corsairs had used a copy of it as a pass¬ port into the Atlantic and had captured over one hundred Americans. Although Logie and his superior officer. Lord

• Page 68

  in failing to issue a warning in order to reduce them to a minimum. (3) The United States had, after the formation of the disastrous truce, encountered another obstacle in the Dey’s refusal to negotiate. The reasons which he had given for such a course were American un¬ trustworthiness and the necessity of providing constant employment for his corsairs. (4) Early in 1794 the United States government had become sufficiently aroused by the Algerine situation to authorize the construction of a small naval armament. The measure was not, however, over¬ whelmingly supported in Congress. New England representatives were, on the whole, its staunchest friends; southern members were, with few exceptions, its enemies. It was passed in the House by a majority of only eleven votes, and with the proviso that in the event of peace with Algiers its operation should immediately be suspended.

• Page 72

  $240,000, would go to the Dey and his family, and that the total sum was $279,600 more than he had been paid by the Dutch.^* The Dey agreed to accept the offer with a proviso that the United States must pay an annuity in stores and provide biennial presents “the same as paid by Holland, Sweden, and Denmark.” A few hours later adjustments were made which obligated the United States to pay in cash a total sum of $642,500 and an annual tribute of twelve thousand Algerine sequins ($21,600) in naval stores.^®

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  Late in November Humphreys gave his approval to the treaty, and on March 2, 1796, the Senate advised ratification. The document contained twenty-two articles, the majority relating to seizures and other molestations. Provision was made for furnishing American vessels with passports within eighteen months after the formation of the treaty. Foreign countries could not sell captured American vessels in Algiers, but Americans were permitted to sell their prizes in Algerine ports.Considerate treat ment was guaranteed Americans who voluntarily or as a result of accident landed in Algiers. Naval and military stores might enter Algerine ports free of duty, but all other articles should be subject to the duties paid by countries possessing treaties with Algiers. Articles brought to Algiers for the American consul and his family should be duty free. Slaves escaping to American vessels were to be “immediately returned” to their Algerine masters. The Dey was to decide disputes between his subjects and citizens of the United States in Algiers; but in those be¬ tween United States’ citizens, the consul should have jurisdiction.

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  On April 2, the Dey publicly announced that within eight days he would declare war against the United States; then at the expiration of another thirty days he would begin to capture American vessels.®® In order to postpone such an event for at least three months Barlow promised that the United States would give to the Dey’s daughter a ship of thirty-six guns, and to a Jewish broker named Bacri a present of $18,000.

   Barlow estimated the total expenditures for frigate and commission at $53,000.®® In order to soothe the Dey still more, Barlow proffered him a consular present of far greater value than that ordinarily given at Algiers.

  The Dey hesitated to accept it because the United States had not paid him for the treaty, but finally consented on the ground that a distribution of the present would tend to stop criticism on the part of many Algerine officers.^® He also ordered Cathcart to go to Philadelphia to aid in the collection and transportation of the promised presents. His reason for this, he said, was a desire to protect the treaty from the attacks of its enemies; an object which might be attained if it could be demonstrated that the Americans were “more punctual and honest than other nations.”^^

• Page 75

  The captives were sent to Marseilles in an Algerine ship, the “Fortune.” After they had been landed the vessel sailed away, flying the American colors. It was cap¬ tured by the British who claimed it on the basis of the Algerines’ having secured it as a prize. Bacri and Com pany, the owners, estimated their loss at $40,000 and pre¬ sented to Barlow a bill for that amount. The claimants contended that the flag of any nation at peace with Algiers protected the Algerine vessel and cargo over which it flew. Barlow, according to O’Brien, “had no alternative but to entail this sum as a debt on the United States.”^^

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  In the relations between the United States and Algiers during the years 1793 to 1797 Europeans played an im¬ portant part. The activities of Logie, and his government’s approval of the Portuguese-Algerine truce, have already been noted.®^ Portugal, after permitting an Al¬ gerine raid into the Atlantic, refused to ratify the truce and provided convoys for American merchantmen. In April, 1794, she definitely renewed the struggle against the corsairs.®^ This enraged the Dey who “damned” Logie for forming the truce without Portugal’s consent and threatened to declare war on England.®® This anger at the

• Page 78

  The confidence in the friendship of these two Europeans that in 1796 the United States Government offered to P. E. Skjoldebrand a consular commission.®® Cathcart wrote that the Danish and Venetian agents at Algiers were fearful lest the formation of a treaty with the United States would be followed by an Algerine war against Den mark and Venice. They therefore sought to convince the Dey “that the United States had neither the means nor the inclination to comply with his demands,”®^

• Page 81

  managed their affairs with those Regencies.”^" His refer¬ ence to Barbary was not here confined to Algiers. He might properly, however, have added that the million dol¬ lar Algerine peace had increased exactions from the United States and Algiers over the period covered by this chapter, one observes a number of significant results. 

  On the one hand, American captives had been liberated; peace had been established with the most formidable of the Barbary powers; the Algerine ruler had promised to aid the United States in forming treaties with Tripoli and Tunis; and there had been constructed a small naval arma¬ ment which provided greater security to American com¬ merce.

   But, on the other hand, the United States gov¬ ernment had paid a huge sum for ransom and for the initial peace; it had made valuable concessions in the form of presents not stipulated by the treaty; it had bound itself to pay an annual tribute in naval stores which would be used for piratical purposes. The magnitude of these concessions had stimulated Tripolitan and Tunisian greed, and had alarmed European maritime states. Finally, hav¬ ing purchased peace so dearly at Algiers, the new republic had begun to treat with Tripoli and Tunis. Its hope for success in these negotiations was based upon the good faith of a pirate and the efficacy of bribes. Such had been the policy of the government which, it was claimed, possessed “millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute.”

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  Obtaining a treaty from Tripoli was a more difficult and expensive task. The young Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli, was extremely militant, and apparently hoped to rival the Dey of Algiers in power.^^ In September, 1796, his corsairs brought to Tripoli two American vessels. Happily, the brig “Sophia,” one of the vessels captured, with O’Brien on board sailed under the protection of an Algerine pass¬ port, and the Pasha ordered her released.^^ The incident resulted in the Dey’s sending a very sharp letter to the Pasha, demanding that he make peace with the United States for $40,000.^®

• Page 87

  The Dey at this juncture made war on Tunis, and in December Barlow wrote exultantly that “fifty thousand ambassadors” had been sent from Algiers to settle Ameri¬ can affairs in Tunis.®^ Although the Dey asserted that his attack was for the sole purpose of securing a treaty for the United States, it may reasonably be supposed that the plundering of a shipwrecked Algerine vessel by Tunisians was an important contributing factor.®® Within a very short time these warlike measures were abandoned. The Bey made presents and “other concessions”;®® whereupon the Dey withdrew his troops, assuring Barlow at the time that the contest was only adjourned.^® “Thus,” wrote Barlow in August, “ended the conquest of Tunis. I have heard not a word of it since.

• Page 94

  In September, 1800, the United States frigate, “George Washington,” reached Algiers, having been sent thither to make another payment of tribute. The Dey, who was at the time in disfavor at Constantinople, demanded that Captain William Bainbridge employ the vessel in bearing an ambassador and certain presents to the Sultan. The Captain and O’Brien at first refused, and for a time it seemed likely that a British vessel would be used. In the end, however, the Dey announced that his mind was “soured” against the British and that the “George Wash¬ ington” must make the voyage in question. When O’Brien refused to assume responsibility for such a measure, the Dey replied that he would assume it. The American flag was then hauled down, the Algerine pennant was hoisted, and the first ship of the United States to reach Con-

• At Constantinople Bainbridge made a very favorable im pression and received from the Turkish government a firman which guaranteed him protection in all Turkish ports. By January 21 the “George Washington” was again at Algiers but was anchored out of range of the Algerine batteries.

   The Dey asked Bainbridge to convey another messenger to Constantinople, but the commander refused and would not place his vessel within reach of the Algerines until the Dey promised to say nothing more about the proposed voyage. When Bainbridge subsequently had an interview with the Dey, the latter made new de¬ mands. At a critical juncture the American produced his Turkish firman. From that moment he was shown the greatest courtesy.^®

• Page 105

  His arbitrary impressment of the “George Washington,” however, had constituted a serious offence and had produced a strenuous protest from American agents in Barbary. W^ith Tripoli war had be¬ come imminent. The Pasha’s demands for an annual tribute and for freedom from Algerine interposition had eventually caused Cathcart to issue a general warning through American officials in Mediterranean ports.

  The Bey of Tunis had also threatened to begin hostilities unless he received presents which had not been promised when the treaty was formed. To the Bey and to the Pasha the United States had granted concessions in order to preserve the peace. At the same time, however, preparations had been made to oppose force with force. The latter measure was the most hopeful thus far noted in the Barbary diplomacy of the United States. 

  It was an act which acorded well with every sentiment of justice. It was the result of mature deliberation extending over many years, during which peaceful expedients had resulted in humilia¬ tion. Although it did not constitute a declaration of complete independence from an age-old system of extortion, it definitely foreshadowed the revolt.

• Page 107

  After leaving Gibraltar the Commodore proceeded to Algiers. Here he found a considerable amount of dissatis faction on account of non-payment of annuities. Consul O’Brien was certain that the appearance of the American frigate at such an opportune time would have a more beneficial effect upon the Dey than would the coming of a storeship. Curiously enough, however, the consul did not think the time propitious for negotiations with the Dey for a commutation of naval stores to a money pay¬ ment.

   The desirability of such a commutation had been emphasized by the Secretary of State in his instructions to O’Brien,^ and it would seem that, if the Dey had been greatly impressed by the arrival of the American flag¬ ship, it would have been well to seek immediately a modifi¬ cation of the stipulation. It would appear, too, that O’Brien had brought little or no pressure to bear on the Dey to make good his guarantee that the Pasha would abide by the treaty of 1796.® If any extenuation for this omission be required, it is to be found in evidence which the Dey had already provided that his guarantee was worthless. 

  In January, 1801, when Cathcart was sur¬ rounded by difficulties at Tripoli, the Dey wrote to Yusuf in the interest of the United States; but inunediately there¬ after informed O’Brien that the latter must pay him for this service.® In April the Dey despatched a second letter yet in May the United States flag at Tripoli came down. By July 22 a third letter had proved to be equally value¬ less, the reason being, according to the Algerine ministry,

• Page 113

  Before all of Morris’s relief squadron reached the Medi¬ terranean certain circumstances indicated that in Tripoli the war was not popular. In December, 1801, Eaton re¬ ported that he had learned from the Danish Commodore that the Tripolitans were eager for peace and for “the restoration of their rightful sovereign, who is a mild man of peaceful disposition.”^® In January the Algerine min¬ istry proposed to Consul O’Brien that inasmuch as a Tripolitan envoy was then at Algiers the time was auspicious to establish peace through Algerine mediation. These advisers informed O’Brien, however, that the pro¬ posed negotiations would of necessity involve some ex¬ pense on the part of the United States. 

  The consul replied that his government had “had sufficient of the bad faith of Tripoli,” and would pay nothing for a treaty of peace.®^ In March it was reported that there was a shortage of provisions in Tripoli; that storms had wrecked a number of Tripolitan vessels; that many Arabs within the Pasha’s dominions had rebelled; and that the chief admiral had

• Page 114

    Similar despatches were sent from Barbary during the succeeding months.®® In May the chief minister of the Bey of Tunis approached Eaton with a proposal for Tunisian mediation. Like the Algerine offer it was accompanied with a request for money, to grant which Eaton considered as inadmissible. The minister as¬ sured him that there could be nothing dishonorable about giving a present to the government of Tripoli, particularly since it could ‘‘not subsist without the generosity of . . . friends.” Eaton’s answer was that the Pasha had by his actions forfeited his right to American friendship; the matter was at this point permitted to drop.®^

• Page 117

  Under such circumstances it was not strange that the Tripolitans succeeded in capturing an American mer chantman and its crew of nine men. The vessel in question was the brig “Franklin,” Captain Andrew Morris, seized off Cape Palos on June 17.

   It was taken to Algiers by its captors, who presented to the Dey some Christian and negro slaves as presents. The Dey gave the Tripolitan captain a lecture regarding the Pasha’s failure to re¬ main at peace with the United States but about the same time ordered a cargo of wheat to be sent to Tripoli.®® O’Brien requested the aid of the Algerine ministry in se curing the release of the brig and her crew but received slight encouragement. He then appealed to the Dey who offered to pay the Tripolitan commander five thousand dollars as a ransom for the prisoners. The officer replied that he had strict instructions to return all prisoners to Tripoli; whereupon the Dey announced that the “Frank¬ lin” and her crew must be removed from Algiers.®^ On July 9, Eaton wrote that on the preceding day the brig and her cargo had been auctioned off at Tunis but that the master and crew were “destined for Tripoli.”

  There they arrived July 19, and according to Captain Morris’s account, entered the harbor “in view of a Swedish and American frigate, who never made the least effort to obstruct our progress when it was certainly in their power to capture or run the pirate on shore before it was possible for them to be protected from their batteries ... this trans¬ action was in open day in sight of thousands amongst which the consuls of different nations can testify.”®® Five of the prisoners, who were not Americans, were soon re¬ leased, the remainder being held until October. They were then liberated as a result of Algerine intervention, which cost the United States sixty-five hundred dollars.

• Page 155

  pert witling” who had combined to heap calumny upon the administration for the wretched manner in which it had conducted the war and had concluded peace.^ To this organ the treaty was entirely satisfactory, as indicated by the statement that ‘‘Our captive countrymen have been restored to the bosom of their country, peace has been made on honorable terms ... We have got all we wanted.”^^ The Aurora expressed unqualified approval of the treaty in the following words: “Our conceptions have been realized—events speak for themselves—the government has performed its duty, regardless of the rhapsodies of its causeless enemies, or the perfidy of its pretended friends.”^® On the other hand, certain New England news¬ papers seem to have found little to be commended in the treaty. 

  The Boston Gazette was unstinted in its denuncia¬ tion of the Intelligencer* s “whitewashing comments [which] when carefully filtrated, and purged of their meretricious colouring, turn out to be downright insults to the common understanding of man.” The Boston Repertory held up to ridicule an article which had recently appeared in the Richmond Enquirer; and the Salem Register in commenting on the treaty, indulged in stric¬ tures which were concluded with the remark: “We
  

• Page 169

  Lear learned about this incident from the Dey, who nevertheless assured the Consul-General that the affair would not disturb the good relationship which had so recently been established.^® Here the matter tem¬ porarily rested, but on March 16, 1808, the Dey peremp¬ torily ordered Lear to pay him eighteen thousand dollars for eight Algerine subjects who had lost their lives as a result of the recapture of the “Mary Ann.’^ Lear refused to make the payment, and, despite threats of personal en¬ slavement, remained fixed in this determination until he was informed that Algerine vessels had been ordered to make an attack upon American commerce. Fearing that the cruise would be successful, he at length agreed to pay the amount in question, but only on condition that the cruising orders be recalled, and not repeated in the future.®®

• Page 170

  During the remainder of the period 1808 to 1812, there were comparatively few alarming situations with which Lear had to deal. In November, of the former year, Achmet Pasha was murdered by the Algerine soldiery, and a successor, Ali Cogia, was chosen.®^ The new Dey showed him¬ self well-disposed towards the United States; consequently, during his brief reign no serious friction developed between the two nations. But Ali displayed too little activity to be popular with the soldiers, who, in characteristic fashion, strangled him, and elevated a certain Hadji Ali, a popular Algerine official, to the Dey ship.

  The latter, for a number of years after his accession, conducted himself in a friendly manner towards the United States. Indeed, he had no cause for dissatisfaction inasmuch as he received the

• But on August 25, the Algerines captured the brig Edwin,” of Salem, and conveyed it to Algiers. The Captain, George C. Smith, and crew of ten, after being stripped of their belongings, were set to hard labor on the mole. 

  Their condition remained thus until eventually improved through funds provided by Lear, certain American mer¬ chants at Cadiz, and Mr. Norderling at Algiers. The Swedish Consul wrote, in April, 1813, that the captives were more comfortably situated, a number of them having been granted permission to reside with officials of other countries. The condition of the remainder he described as

• Page 176

  The formation of peace with Great Britain afforded the United States an excellent opportunity to punish Algerine avarice and treachery. Moreover, the fact that Algiers, possessing only a small navy,^ was at war with the mari time states of Italy, Spain, Holland, Prussia, Denmark, and Russia, made the time propitious for a final account ing with the Dey.

  On February 23,1815, President Madison, therefore, recommended to Congress a declaration of war, and on March 2, that body authorized the equipping and use of such vessels of the navy as the President might think necessary to wage effective hostilities against Algiers.

• Page 176

  ^Despatches, Tunis, IV, R. Keene to M. M. Noah, May 22, 1814. “The Algerine squadron,” wrote Keene, “is composed of four frigates, four corvettes, three sloops of war, a Greek prize ship and some terms Decatur’s forces were to proceed to Gibraltar, Xre inquiry was to be made regarding the whereabouts of AlgerL cruisers. If any had passed the Straits into the Atlantic, Decatur was to endeavor to capture or de stroy them.

  He was also instructed to declare the city of Algiers blockaded, and after reaching the Algerine capital, was to open negotiations with the Dey. A final admonition was that ‘‘at whatever time the negotiation is opened, whether it be before, or after proceeding to extremities, the conditions must be such as are honorable to the United

• Page 177

  Decatur’s squadron arrived at Gibraltar on June 15, the Commodore having learned in the meantime that some Algerine cruisers under the command of Reis Hammida had recently been in the Atlantic but had returned to the Mediterranean.® Hoping to take them by surprise, Decatur hastened onward to the locality in which it appeared most likely that he would encounter Hammida.  On June 17, the “Constellation” sighted a frigate in the vicinity of Cape de Gat. It was the Algerine Admiral’s flagship, the “Mashuda,” which immediately headed for Algiers. Being rapidly overtaken, however, it turned towards the Spanish coast, only to be intercepted by the Americans and eventu¬ ally forced to surrender. Hammida and about thirty of his men were killed in the engagement, while over four hun¬ dred Algerines were taken prisoner. Four Americans lost their lives in the encounter, three being killed by the burst¬ ing of a gun on board the “Guerriere.”® Two days later, the American squadron discovered an Algerine brig, the

• Page 178

  The ruling Dey at the time of Decatur’s arrival at Algiers was a man named Omar, who possessed great cour age and determination. He had become Dey early in 1816 in consequence of a revolution during which the Turkish soldiers had murdered Hadji Ali. About the time Decatur’s forces reached Algiers, Omar’s navy consisted of four frigates, five corvettes, one brig, a galley, and a number of gunboats. The vessels were, on the whole,, however, poorly equipped and manned.^® Moreover, the Algerine fortifica¬ tions were in a bad state of repair, and deficient with re¬ spect to the mounting and manning of guns.^^

• Page 178

  On June 29, Decatur displayed from the “Guerriere” a fiag of truce and the Swedish flag, thereby indicating that he wished to carry on negotiations through the Swedish Consul. The latter, accompanied by the Algerine Captain of Marine, soon came aboard the “Guerriere,” where they were informed about the capture of the Algerine frigate and brig, and the death of Hammida. The Captain of Marine seemed deeply impressed; wished to learn on what terms the Americans proposed to treat; and ex¬ pressed a desire that hostilities should cease. Decatur and Shaler thereupon gave him a letter which President Madi¬ son had written to the Dey. The official and Mr. Norderling went ashore to deliver this message and to receive instruc¬ tions. The following day they returned to the “Guerriere” with authorization to negotiate. Decatur and Shaler then presented to them a draft of a proposed treaty. This pro¬ vided for the abolition of tribute, the release of American prisoners at Algiers, the payment of ten thousand dollars as indemnification for the seizure of the ‘ 

  Edwin, the restoration of other American property then in the pos¬ session of the Dey, and the treatment of captives, in the event of future hostilities, as prisoners of war rather than as slaves. The Captain of Marine argued that some of these conditions were unprecedented and expressed serious doubts regarding their ratification by the Dey. He also sought to have the captured Algerine vessels returned to his master, and, after some deliberation, the American commissioners decided to grant his request. The vessels, they concluded, would be of little value to the United States; while their relinquishment would probably cause the Dey to yield more readily to the demands incorporated in the draft of the proposed treaty. Then came a request for a truce, to allow time for deliberation regarding the treaty. 

  “The reply, the Commissioners subsequently re¬ ported, was ‘Not a minute; if your squadron appears in sight before the treaty is actually signed by the Dey, and the prisoners sent off, ours will capture them.’ ” It was finally agreed, by way of compromise, that hostilities would be suspended as soon as the boat, displaying a white flag, should leave the mainland. The Swedish Consul promised that the flag should not be displayed unless the treaty were signed and the prisoners in the boat. 

  Within three hours after leaving the “Guerriere” the boat was back with the prisoners and a copy of the signed treaty on board. It was fortunate that the trip had been completed so soon; other¬ wise, an Algerine corvette which had hove in sight would undoubtedly have been captured.^^

• Page 180

  Having concluded peace with Algiers, and having de¬ spatched two vessels from the squadron to convoy the Algerine frigate and brig from Carthagena, Decatur de¬ cided to visit Tunis and Tripoli. The United States had been having some diflSculty with these regencies since early in 1815 because the Bey and the Pasha had permitted British warships to retake prizes which the American privateer “Abaellino” had brought into Timisian and Tripolitan ports.

  Consul Noah at Tunis, and Consul Richard B. Jones at Tripoli had protested to the utmost against this violation of existing treaties, but to no avail; the former’s remonstrances had been ridiculed, and the latter’s.

• Page 182

  Both officers were most enthusiastically received by their countrymen.*® Ratification of the treaty which Decatur and Shaler had dictated to the Dey was advised by the Senate, Decem¬ ber 21, 1815, and five days later it was proclaimed by the President. On January 22 following, the frigate “Java,” commanded by Captain Oliver H. Perry, sailed from the United States with the ratified document and with despatches for Consul-General Shaler.

   Perry reached Gibraltar on February 13 and about three weeks later joined Commodore Shaw, who thereupon proceeded with his squadron to Algiers. Between April 1 and April 4, six United States warships anchored before the Algerine capi¬ tal, which, at the time, was being visited by a British squad¬ ron under the command of Admiral Lord Exmouth. The latter concluded negotiations with the Dey soon after

• Page 184

  An event which occurred in August at Algiers proved advantageous to the United States. A large fleet, con¬ sisting of British and Dutch warships under the command of Lord Exmouth, appeared before the Algerine capital. During the course of a terrific bombardment which ensued, the Algerine fleet was virtually destroyed; the marine section of the city was cut to pieces; and great havoc was wrought elsewhere.®^ Concerning the damage inflicted by the bombardment, Shaler made this entry in his Journal:

• Page 185

  Upon receipt of these messages, the two commissioners returned to Algiers, arriving there December 8, 1816. Be¬ cause of stormy weather it did not seem expedient for Commodore Chauncey to go ashore; consequently Shaler alone represented the United States in the negotiations with the Dey. On December 9, the Dey was sent a letter which constituted the commissioners’ ultimatum. It de¬ fended the conduct of the United States with respect to the restored frigate and brig; denied the Dey’s right to reject the treaty; refused recognition of a provision in the Algerine copy of the treaty, obligating the United States to make consular presents; and proposed a modifi¬ cation of Article XVHI in order to give the United States

• Page 189

  After peace had been concluded with Algiers, O Brien negotiated a treaty with Tripoli, and the following year (1797) Famin concluded one with Tunis. These agree¬ ments involved smaller concessions than did the Algerine peace, and were somewhat comparable in that respect to the Moroccan treaty which Barclay had formed and which James Simpson had, in 1795, renewed. 

  The treaty with Tunis was more expensive than was that with Tripoli but was ultimately of greater advantage to the United States. Neither the Bey nor the Pasha was pleased with his bar¬ gain, particularly after they fully realized what a magnifi¬ cent treaty the Dey had acquired. They, therefore, almost constantly threatened to declare war against the United States, and eventually the Pasha put his threats into execution.

• Page 193

  After the close of the War with Tripoli, the United States continued to pay tribute to Algiers in accordance with the treaty of 1796; but the spirit of resistance to imposition was becoming mtensiHed in consequence of the contest with the Pasha, additional demand, made by the Dey of Algiers, and numerous differences wdh England_ The last-named dispute, culminatmg m the War of 1812 and the Dey’s breaking of his treaty with the United States, eventually provided the needed opportunity for becoming independent of the Barbary Powers. In 1816 war was formally declared against Algiers, and two United States naval squadrons were fitted out for Mediterranean service. One of these, under the command of Commodore Decatur, soon captured two Algerine cruisers, blockaded the city of Algiers, and secured an eminently honorable treaty. Decatur thereupon proceeded to Tunis and Tripoli where he collected indemnity from the Bey and Pasha for losses sustained when British warships had seized prize vessels which Americans had taken into Tunisian and Tripolitan ports. Within a short time after these inci¬ dents occurred, the Dey of Algiers rejected the treaty which h^ had formed with the United States, but the de¬ struction wrought by Exmouth’s forces in 1816, together with the presence of United States warships at Algiers, resulted in the ruler’s ultimate ratification. Thenceforth, disputes of consequence between the United States and Barbary were at an end.

• Page 194

  For commercial and political reasons the English gov ernment refused at the close of the Revolution to aid the United States in securing protection from North African pirates. During the following decade it pursued a policy which, if not helpful, appears to have placed no additional obstacles in the way of America’s obtaining immunity from piracy. 

  In 1793, however, there was formed the PortugueseAlgerine truce which provided ample justification for pro¬ test. Although it cannot be shown that the officials in England sought to injure the United States by promoting the armistice, it seems almost beyond belief that they failed to foresee any unfortunate consequences of the act. So far as Consul Logie’s participation in the transaction is con¬ cerned it should be noted that there is the testimony of one auditor to the eifect that he had heard Logie instruct¬ ing the Algerine captains how to capture at least a dozen American vessels. To say that Logie was in that respect carrying out instructions from London is unwarranted; but in justice to all parties concerned it may properly be asserted that the action of both high and low officials in this affair presents two alternative conclusions: the meas¬ ure was consciously unfriendly or it was the result of stupidity. From 1794 until the close of the war with Tripoli there was no recurrence of an incident of this sort; in fact, English and American relations with respect to Barbary were on the whole satisfactory. 

  There was some friction between naval officers, and Cathcart on one occasion offered to fight a duel with McDonough whom he charged with inciting war between the United States and Tripoli. Preble, on the other hand, appears to have been on very intimate terms with a number of prominent English officials, and Eaton secured valuable assistance from Eng¬ lishmen in Egypt.^ During the later period, when AngloAmerican relations became so strained, and were finally broken off, Algerine dissatisfaction with the United States received a stimulus from official English sources. The Dey placed great confidence in the power of the British fleets.

• Page 195

  and in 1812 declared war against the United States. Three years later when Decatur’s squadron was at Algiers, an Algerine minister said to the English Consul: “You told us that the Americans would be swept from the seas in six months by your navy, and now they make war upon us with some of your own vessels which they have taken.

• Page 197

  The Spanish government during the Confederation Period showed a marked disposition to facilitate the formation of a treaty between the United States and Morocco, and gave some evidence of a desire to aid the former power at Algiers. 

  The fact that hundreds of Spanish subjects were, during a considerable portion of the period, held captive by the Dey is alone sufficient to prove that Spain had little influence in shaping Algerine policies with respect to the United States. 

  From 1787 until 1806, Spanish officials seem to have participated only slightly in the Barbary affairs of the United States; but during the course of the Tripolitan War, the Spanish consul at Tripoli rendered some services which Lear regarded as quite unsatisfactory; and Commodore Preble charged the Spanish government with subsidizing the Pasha to the ex¬ tent of sending a number of shipbuilders to aid him in naval construction.

• Page 202

  Moroccan rulers. Mohamet Pasha (d. 1791) and Hasan Pasha (d. 1798) were especially aggressive. The former steadfastly refused to give up the crews of the “Dauphin” and “Maria,” and in this course his successor also per¬ sisted. Hasan Pasha, however, was far more successful in his plundering than was Mohamet Pasha. He captured over one hundred Americans and secured from the United States a million dollar treaty. Pleased with his acquisition, he promised to aid the United States in forming satisfac¬ tory treaties with Tunis and Tripoli. But fulfillment was a different matter; the conquest of Tunis evaporated in thin air, and the aid given at Tripoli was at best question¬ able with respect to beneficial results. 

  The rule of Hasan’s successor, Mustapha, was characterized by the heaping of further indignities upon the United States: the impress¬ ment of the “George Washington,” the refusal to receive Cathcart, the detention of funds sent to effect a commu¬ tation of stipulated payments of tribute, and the requisi¬ tion of presents not promised in the treaty. Nor did Mustapha exert himself to make effective the Algerine guarantee that the Pasha of Tripoli would abide by the treaty of 1796. In view of all these circumstances it is not strange that O’Brien wrote sadly: “As to keeping the peace on honorable or equitable terms—these words have meanings which cannot be well translated at Algiers.”

•  Page 213

• History of the Barbary States tn General. Salem, 1806. Primarily useful for background of American relations

• Page 216

  Barlow, Joel, 2; description of Algerine government, 4; goes to Algiers, 73; difficulties, 74; borrows money from Bacri, 76; seeks Algerine aid in dealing with Tripoli and Tunis, 76; leaves Algiers, 92; correspon¬ dence cited, 70-92.

• Page 217

  Commerce, American, in the Mediterranean, prior to the Revolution, 17-19; protection for sought, 20-24; made safer, 34-35; injury inflicted upon, 4647; protected by Portuguese, 62-63; opinions regarding safety of, 78; increase of, 101; extensive during War with Tripoli, 116-17; defenseless, 167; Algerine menace to, 169; attacked by England and Al¬ giers, 172-73.

• Page 217

  Congress, takes first steps in dealing with Barbary States, 20; seeks French aid, 22; commis¬ sions Adams, Jefferson, and Franklin to form treaties with Barbary, 27-28; reports sent to, 28; thanks King of Spain for services, 28; makes appropria¬ tions for Barbary negotiations, 34; Tripolitan question referred to, 42; fails to support pro¬ posal to form league against piracy, 60; appropriates money for negotiations with Algiers, 66; seeks aid from Netherlands, 64; debates of regarding Por¬ tuguese-Algerine truce, 62-63;

• Page 217

  Corsairs, of Barbary, extent of depredations, 9; Algerine, seize Americans, 37; advisability of waging war against, 47; cap¬ ture Americans, 60; Tripolitan, seize American vessels, 84.

• Page 220

  Hammida, Algerine admiral, 177.

• Page 220

  Humphreys, David, given secre¬ tarial position, 28; U. S. min¬ ister to Portugal, 66; Algerine mission, 67; warning to Ameri¬ cans, 60; abandons mission to Algiers, 61; instructions to, 69; returns to America, 70; goes to Europe with new in structions, 70-71; approves treaty formed with Tunis, 88. sends O’Brien to London, 73; secures credit in London, 7476; approves treaty formed with Tripoli, 86; approves treaty formed with Tunis, 88.

• Page 221

  “Mashuda,” Algerine cruiser, captured by Americans, 177; taken to Carthagena, 178; re¬ turned to Algerines, 179.

• Page 222

  Newspapers, American, on Por¬ tuguese-Algerine truce, 63-64; on U. S. treaty with Tripoli, 164-60.

• Page 224

  Souza, Luiz Pinto de, Portuguese minister, on PortugueseAlgerine truce, 69.

   

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  The Christian Monitor 1817-02-01: Vol 2 Iss 11

  
  

  Page 165

  The followup narrative was committed to writing by an aged clenr. eyman in Virginia, toll, is communicated tor publication by a missionary of known character. Its authenticity may be relied on.— lt is introduced by the writer with the ftollowing paragraphs. “I have long been of opinion, that even the short account I am able to give of.   Salem the Algerine, is worth preserving; and suppose that no person now living: is able to give so full an account of i as myself, nos having had the same means of information. WI en I had committed this account of Salem to writing, I thought it not improper to add that of the Negro, in Henrico, because it bears in one respect, a considerable resemblance to the other.